39 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
39 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
# P05-OIDC-01 — Disposable Real OIDC Browser Acceptance
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**Approved baseline:** `f423c696544f28a42d6a5d1ad0acfd88a3b6f56d`
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**Planned verification:** manual Gitea Actions `.gitea/workflows/p05-oidc-acceptance.yml`
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**Status:** **Gitea Run #90 FAILED**: four services healthy, no host ports; localhost:8080 forwarder not ready and provisioning aborted *before* disposable OIDC client/user/browser creation. **Mandatory owned-only cleanup PASS**. Real interactive OIDC remains BLOCKED.
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## What this phase actually tests
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- A completely disposable instance of the existing official **ZITADEL v4.20.4**, PostgreSQL, prebuilt **Login V2** and Traefik, with *no published runner host port*.
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- An IAM_OWNER PAT for CI-only official provisioning. The token expires quickly, is never printed and is never mounted into the Account Portal/browser. Separate login-client PAT from the unchanged P02 Compose remains limited to Login V2.
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- An actual project, OIDC Web authorization-code client with redirect `http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback/zitadel`, and an actual **new CI-only human account**, with a random password and verified `.invalid` email. All data are within the disposable PostgreSQL volumes.
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- A real Chromium browser follows **Continue with ZITADEL** → unmodified ZITADEL Login V2 username/password → genuine Auth.js authorization-code callback. PKCE S256, state and nonce are checked from actual outgoing browser authorization navigation; no sessions are mocked or injected.
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- Success requires authenticated `GET /api/account/me` returning the **exact** provisioned user's ID, HttpOnly Auth.js session cookie, allowed protected Account page; rejection of anonymous/invalid callback, and local Account Portal sign-out returning 401.
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- `always()` resource cleanup removes only CI-owned containers, the temporary secret volume, the IAM_OWNER bootstrap and PostgreSQL data, with explicit absence verification. A cleanup failure blocks acceptance.
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## CI network and security boundary
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The existing P02 Compose external issuer is `http://localhost:8080`. Account Portal `users/ui/src/lib/env.ts` allows HTTP localhost only when **not** running as production, and correctly requires HTTPS for production. Rather than altering authentication source or falsely claiming a production TLS test, this phase runs the unchanged Account Portal with **`next dev` only within a disposable Gitea Chromium container**, co-located on the private Docker proxy network namespace. A run-scoped localhost:8080 → proxy:80 TCP forward preserves exact discovery issuer and browser redirects **without publishing any host port**. The official ZITADEL backend, existing development Compose, original Login V2, Auth.js, Account UI, package manifests and lockfiles remain READ ONLY.
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The user test credentials, admin PAT, OAuth codes, cookies and browser URLs with query strings are never printed, committed or uploaded. No production or real human account is touched.
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## Running / interpretation
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Authorize and dispatch the **one** manual workflow under Gitea [ZitPlane Actions](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/ZitPlane/actions). Do not trigger it outside a dedicated Docker runner. A full PASS needs **all** official client/user creation, real browser password/callback/positive and negative identity evidence and complete owned resource teardown, verified by named CI markers and final job SUCCESS. If the runner lacks Docker, a provisioning API is incompatible, real authorization cannot complete, or cleanup fails, the phase remains **BLOCKED** with the exact verified point of failure; it is not silently downgraded into metadata/JWKS smoke.
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**Not covered:** human MFA/passkeys, Admin Console human E2E, production HTTPS/TLS issuer, source-built Login V2 runtime wiring, real global SSO logout and production Coolify deployment. These are separate explicit Scope Locks. The final actual Gitea results are recorded in `notes/P05-OIDC-01.md`.
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## Actual Gitea Run #90 — BLOCKED, resources cleaned
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[Run #90](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/ZitPlane/actions/runs/90) tested `cbcd60e76ec909df4f9c5826adf7a3e2a899c73e`. Job #197 **FAILED** after the approved disposable PostgreSQL/ZITADEL API/official Login V2/Traefik stack became healthy and the no-published-host-port configuration passed. The CI-only localhost:8080 forwarder did **not** become ready; the provisioning helper emitted `ZITPLANE_OIDC_PROVISION_BLOCKED: Disposable localhost issuer port forwarding was not ready`. **No OIDC project, client, human test account, Chromium sign-in or Auth.js callback was created/tested**. Do not describe OIDC as working or accepted.
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**Safety verified:** `always()` step #3 succeeded: `ZITPLANE_BACKEND_CLEANUP_VERIFIED_PASS` and `ZITPLANE_OIDC_ALL_RESOURCES_CLEANED_PASS`, removing only owned database/bootstrap/containers/credentials/volumes/network. No production deployment, real accounts or host ports used.
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**Next:** The precise reason the forwarder failed is **not yet known** because package installation/logs were suppressed. A separately approved P05-OIDC-02 should instrument the *CI-only* sidecar's safe health/exit diagnostics and use a pinned prebuilt forwarding image, then repeat **one** isolated Gitea browser/provisioning acceptance. No Login/Auth.js source edit, IAM bypass, production HTTP or claims of verified browser authentication. Full job IDs, evidence and Scope Lock: `notes/P05-OIDC-01.md`.
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**Follow-up:** P05-OIDC-02 is the approved, CI-only private forwarder diagnostics/prebuilt-image and status-only readiness remediation; see [P05-OIDC-02.md](P05-OIDC-02.md). Until the new Gitea CI actually executes real client/user/Chromium/callback stages successfully, this historical Run #90 failure remains unchanged.
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