5.6 KiB
P05-OIDC-01 — Disposable Real OIDC Browser Acceptance
Approved baseline: f423c696544f28a42d6a5d1ad0acfd88a3b6f56d
Planned verification: manual Gitea Actions .gitea/workflows/p05-oidc-acceptance.yml
Status: Gitea Run #90 FAILED: four services healthy, no host ports; localhost:8080 forwarder not ready and provisioning aborted before disposable OIDC client/user/browser creation. Mandatory owned-only cleanup PASS. Real interactive OIDC remains BLOCKED.
What this phase actually tests
- A completely disposable instance of the existing official ZITADEL v4.20.4, PostgreSQL, prebuilt Login V2 and Traefik, with no published runner host port.
- An IAM_OWNER PAT for CI-only official provisioning. The token expires quickly, is never printed and is never mounted into the Account Portal/browser. Separate login-client PAT from the unchanged P02 Compose remains limited to Login V2.
- An actual project, OIDC Web authorization-code client with redirect
http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback/zitadel, and an actual new CI-only human account, with a random password and verified.invalidemail. All data are within the disposable PostgreSQL volumes. - A real Chromium browser follows Continue with ZITADEL → unmodified ZITADEL Login V2 username/password → genuine Auth.js authorization-code callback. PKCE S256, state and nonce are checked from actual outgoing browser authorization navigation; no sessions are mocked or injected.
- Success requires authenticated
GET /api/account/mereturning the exact provisioned user's ID, HttpOnly Auth.js session cookie, allowed protected Account page; rejection of anonymous/invalid callback, and local Account Portal sign-out returning 401. always()resource cleanup removes only CI-owned containers, the temporary secret volume, the IAM_OWNER bootstrap and PostgreSQL data, with explicit absence verification. A cleanup failure blocks acceptance.
CI network and security boundary
The existing P02 Compose external issuer is http://localhost:8080. Account Portal users/ui/src/lib/env.ts allows HTTP localhost only when not running as production, and correctly requires HTTPS for production. Rather than altering authentication source or falsely claiming a production TLS test, this phase runs the unchanged Account Portal with next dev only within a disposable Gitea Chromium container, co-located on the private Docker proxy network namespace. A run-scoped localhost:8080 → proxy:80 TCP forward preserves exact discovery issuer and browser redirects without publishing any host port. The official ZITADEL backend, existing development Compose, original Login V2, Auth.js, Account UI, package manifests and lockfiles remain READ ONLY.
The user test credentials, admin PAT, OAuth codes, cookies and browser URLs with query strings are never printed, committed or uploaded. No production or real human account is touched.
Running / interpretation
Authorize and dispatch the one manual workflow under Gitea ZitPlane Actions. Do not trigger it outside a dedicated Docker runner. A full PASS needs all official client/user creation, real browser password/callback/positive and negative identity evidence and complete owned resource teardown, verified by named CI markers and final job SUCCESS. If the runner lacks Docker, a provisioning API is incompatible, real authorization cannot complete, or cleanup fails, the phase remains BLOCKED with the exact verified point of failure; it is not silently downgraded into metadata/JWKS smoke.
Not covered: human MFA/passkeys, Admin Console human E2E, production HTTPS/TLS issuer, source-built Login V2 runtime wiring, real global SSO logout and production Coolify deployment. These are separate explicit Scope Locks. The final actual Gitea results are recorded in notes/P05-OIDC-01.md.
Actual Gitea Run #90 — BLOCKED, resources cleaned
Run #90 tested cbcd60e76ec909df4f9c5826adf7a3e2a899c73e. Job #197 FAILED after the approved disposable PostgreSQL/ZITADEL API/official Login V2/Traefik stack became healthy and the no-published-host-port configuration passed. The CI-only localhost:8080 forwarder did not become ready; the provisioning helper emitted ZITPLANE_OIDC_PROVISION_BLOCKED: Disposable localhost issuer port forwarding was not ready. No OIDC project, client, human test account, Chromium sign-in or Auth.js callback was created/tested. Do not describe OIDC as working or accepted.
Safety verified: always() step #3 succeeded: ZITPLANE_BACKEND_CLEANUP_VERIFIED_PASS and ZITPLANE_OIDC_ALL_RESOURCES_CLEANED_PASS, removing only owned database/bootstrap/containers/credentials/volumes/network. No production deployment, real accounts or host ports used.
Next: The precise reason the forwarder failed is not yet known because package installation/logs were suppressed. A separately approved P05-OIDC-02 should instrument the CI-only sidecar's safe health/exit diagnostics and use a pinned prebuilt forwarding image, then repeat one isolated Gitea browser/provisioning acceptance. No Login/Auth.js source edit, IAM bypass, production HTTP or claims of verified browser authentication. Full job IDs, evidence and Scope Lock: notes/P05-OIDC-01.md.
Follow-up: P05-OIDC-02 is the approved, CI-only private forwarder diagnostics/prebuilt-image and status-only readiness remediation; see P05-OIDC-02.md. Until the new Gitea CI actually executes real client/user/Chromium/callback stages successfully, this historical Run #90 failure remains unchanged.