**Scope:** Only describe issues the current source or recorded phase evidence supports. Run #86 verified an isolated disposable backend, but no developer-PC environment or production deployment has been verified.
| Symptom | Known possible cause | Safe next action |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `docker` command not found | Docker CLI/Desktop was missing on the previously inspected Windows host during P02 | Install supported Docker Engine/Desktop and run only in a local disposable environment; do not treat a source manifest as runtime acceptance |
| `docker compose config` / `up` fails | Local machine Docker/config differences or occupied port may differ from validated CI stack | Gitea Run #86 verified isolated portless CI Compose; check environment-specific logs with secrets redacted; do not confuse its portless override with P02 local loopback Compose |
| Admin Console login fails | First-instance bootstrap, Login V2 container/PAT, auth proxy or credentials not validated | Verify local health, first-init logs and policy in a secret-safe environment; do not reinitialize volumes casually |
| Account Portal shows no page | App dependencies are not installed; no Account Portal image, runtime or domain is configured | Complete reviewed lockfile/build/CI and explicit integration phase before troubleshooting live UI |
| Redirect/callback error after future login | OIDC issuer/callback URL, client type/secret, proxy headers, PKCE/state or allowed redirect may mismatch | Compare exact configured origins and registered callback; never weaken checks or wildcard redirects |
| Unauthorized on `/api/account/me` | Designed result for absent/expired user identity | Authenticate through ZITADEL; if unexpected in a future runtime, inspect token expiry and session trace securely |
| Profile Save button missing | Portal source has read-only fields only | Use permitted ZITADEL self-service (if configured) or wait for an approved custom edit feature |
| MFA/passkey settings not editable in portal | Portal only shows informational cards and a link | Use the identity provider's policy-supported controls; do not paste secrets into support messages |
| Sign-out seems to leave other applications signed in | Portal `signOut` is **portal-local**, not federated logout | Close respective sessions via app/identity provider; global logout requires a future dedicated implementation |
| `auth.vib.tools` / `account.vib.tools` unavailable | They are **planned** hostnames, no production deployment configured | Do not assume DNS/SSL/Coolify service exists; await P07 |
| Login V2 custom source appears unchanged when starting P02 Compose | P02 Compose uses prebuilt official Login UI, not P03 imported code | Later P05 must build and wire custom image after CI and explicit approval |
## How to report a safe issue
Include environment (local disposable vs CI vs production), exact phase/commit, which page/action, a **redacted** error and reproduction conditions. Never publish `.env`, client secret, passwords, access tokens, cookies, private keys or user data. Link to relevant phase note; record the fix and updated user guidance together.
- Prior Account Portal `TS2345` at `src/auth.ts(14,61)` in Gitea Run #81 was fixed by verified JWT subject narrowing; Gitea Run #83 Account Portal typecheck/build **PASS**.
- Previous Alpine backend checkout missed Git; Run #83 verified the fix. Run #83 also exposed an occupied shared-runner host TCP 8080. **Run #86 verified the portless CI Compose overlay**: all four services ready, disposable Postgres restart persistence, ZITADEL ready/OIDC discovery/JWKS and complete CI-only cleanup PASS. This does **not** prove the separate P02 local PC Compose or real user login.
- A green HIGH/CRITICAL advisory audit gate still allows Moderate findings. P05-SEC-01 updates only approved Next.js/OTel dependency manifests and lockfiles and adds an independent **zero Moderate/High/Critical** acceptance gate. Potential `glob`/`minimatch` transitive major-version issues remain open until a real registry CI audit proves otherwise; no suppressions or forced compatibility-breaking overrides.
Account Portal and Login V2 build CI passed in Run #83, disposable backend acceptance passed in Run #86, and dependency lockfiles/workflows exist. **Real authenticated OIDC callback/positive session, MFA/passkey, Admin Console human login, production Coolify/TLS/backup and production support remain UNVERIFIED.** Preserve the Scope Lock in `notes/` and ZITADEL security boundaries.
Gitea Run #87 produced 3 PASS and 1 FAIL. The FAILED `security_login` job is a **deliberate fail-closed Moderate threshold**: `GHSA-3g3m-2fjr-6pw4` in `glob` (fix >=14.0.2) and `GHSA-g3hv-75wg-m249` in `minimatch` (fix >=11.0.1). Account npm audit returned 0. Login's earlier Next.js/OTel advisories no longer reproduce, its frozen build and 1219 tests PASS, and High/Critical remain 0. Do not turn off auditing, ignore Moderate reports, modify protected auth code or force incompatible package majors. A separate P05-SEC-02 exact Scope Lock must allow controlled PNPM workspace overrides or verified compatible parent upgrades; only a new focused CI run can close security acceptance.
## P05-SEC-02 — scoped major transitive override troubleshooting
If a frozen Login install, Nx build or unit suite fails after this patch, verify the seven exact `parent@version>dependency` selectors in `auth/ui/v2/pnpm-workspace.yaml` and the matching `pnpm-lock.yaml` snapshots; compare with `notes/P05-SEC-02.md`. `glob@14` and `minimatch@11` are semver-major transitive substitutions, so historical parents expecting v10 APIs may need a separately approved compatible parent upgrade. **Do not** apply global overrides, blanket `pnpm audit --fix`, disable the strict zero-Moderate gate, or edit protected Login authentication code. Full security acceptance requires current CI frozen install/build/Vitest and registry audit, not just a clean lockfile.
## P05-SEC-02 Run #88: false-positive override validation (not a runtime failure)
Run #88 Login build job #190 stopped before `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` when the new `transitive_override_contract.py` classified old `axios@>=...` / `brace-expansion@>=...` / `esbuild@>=...` selectors as extra parent overrides. The regex was narrowed **after** the run to accept only direct `>glob` or `>minimatch` overrides. **This fix has not been tested by CI.** Independent Login production security audit job #192 passed with **0 Moderate, 0 High, 0 Critical**; do not confuse that security result with an authenticated login, a production deployment, or a successful frozen build. A separate, explicitly approved Gitea CI run is required for complete Login dependency compatibility acceptance.
## P05-SEC-02-A01 — Run #88 validator false-positive closed in Run #89
The earlier Run #88 CI helper misread `axios@>=` and similar version-range keys as parent overrides. The already-committed suffix-only `>glob` / `>minimatch` correction **passed** in Gitea [Run #89](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/ZitPlane/actions/runs/89), followed by successful frozen PNPM install, original Login Nx production build and **1219/1219** unit tests. The production registry vulnerability audit also passed with **0 Moderate/High/Critical**. The prior false-positive is now **CI-verified resolved**; no repeat local test or production deployment. If future login failures occur, distinguish CI build/unit success from still-untested authenticated OIDC/callback/MFA integration.
## P05-OIDC-01 — isolated real OIDC browser acceptance troubleshooting
The new manual Gitea `p05-oidc-acceptance.yml` is **not a production deployment**. If runner Docker ownership preflight fails, do not delete an existing network/volume or reuse secrets; use a clean runner. If IAM_OWNER PAT or API client/user creation fails, do not use P02's restricted `IAM_LOGIN_CLIENT` PAT as a substitute. If the original Login V2 browser or Auth.js callback fails, report only the safe blocker marker and do **not** mock tokens, disable PKCE/state/nonce or alter production auth source. If cleanup cannot prove empty run-owned Docker resources, the job must remain FAILED. The HTTP localhost issuer works only in the private Gitea CI development environment; production HTTPS requires a separate Scope Lock. Exact current evidence: `notes/P05-OIDC-01.md`.
## P05-OIDC-01 Run #90 — private loopback forwarder NOT ready
Job #197 in [Run #90](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/ZitPlane/actions/runs/90) failed after four healthy backend services. The CI-only forwarding sidecar never made `localhost:8080` reachable within the 70-second provisioner wait. The sidecar suppresses its `apk add socat` startup diagnostics, so its **exact failure cause is not confirmed**. **Do not** disable issuer checks, expose port 8080, reuse an IAM_LOGIN_CLIENT token as admin or modify protected Auth.js/Login V2 source. The proper next step is a separately approved narrow CI-only forwarder diagnostics/pinning fix, followed by one isolated run. `always()` cleanup **PASS**; no CI-owned Docker resources remained. No real client/user/browser OIDC assertions ran.
**P05-OIDC-02 diagnostic separation:** If private Traefik:80 returns a non-200 status with `Host: localhost:8080`, the **proxy/Host route** gate fails before launching the sidecar. If the pinned prebuilt socat container exits or is not running, the CI job records a nonsecret container state and exit code. If the process stays running but localhost:8080 HTTP 200 fails, only the HTTP status or fixed socket marker is printed. None of these is a real login/MFA issue until client/user/browser stages execute. Do not enable host ports, disable PKCE or print secret URLs; require successful owned cleanup on every run. Actual evidence: `notes/P05-OIDC-02.md`.