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DataStack/notes/001-PRODUCTION-FORENSIC-AUDIT.md
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fix(p04-s01c): accept scoped PostCSS reconciliation with CI #85 7/7 PASS [skip ci]

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# DataStack — Production-Readiness Forensic Audit (Documentation Baseline)
Status: **BASELINE FORENSIC SNAPSHOT; P01 VERIFIED AND CLOSED (see closure appendix)**. Date: 2026-11-22 (Asia/Dhaka).
Frozen source HEAD: `d725841ebc828d58cbe90f517da9e600f23c4630`. Local, Gitea `vibtools/DataStack`, GitLab `ivibtools/datastack`, and GitHub `JILLU-Games/DataStack` confirmed at this exact HEAD before writing these notes.
Scope of this document: **evidence-backed CI and source review**, not proof that every production feature works. No Coolify live write, rollback, restart or deployment was conducted. Public GET `https://data.ivib.cc/api/health` returned `status: online`; full DB/Redis/MCP/S3 transaction health is not established.
## Findings classification
- **8 finding groups** from actual CI: **5 code/test/lockfile groups** (CI-01…05) and **3 CI infrastructure/security-review groups** (CI-06…08). **Not 43 separate bugs**: the 43 compiler errors belong to CI-05.
- **2 failing assertions, 4 timeout suites** (24 TypeScript suites in run #45: 18 clean, 6 fail/timeout).
- **3 extra source-observed reliability risks** (R-01…03) have NOT been reproduced as production failures; they require targeted fault injection before any fix or behavior change.
- **Do not equate successful test/source feature with verified production runtime.**
## Eight confirmed findings / blockers
| ID | Severity* | Evidence (run/job) | Exact affected area | Verified observation | Planned phase |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CI-01 | High | Run #42 job 63; #45 job 71 | `package-lock.json`, `package.json`; `.gitea/workflows/datastack-ci.yml` Windows job | Original Windows `npm ci` reports missing platform dependency entries; regenerate lock **only in runner** -> SDK builds. Lock not fixed in repo. | P01 |
| CI-02 | Medium | Run #45 job 66 | `bun.lock` and `tests/phase07-deployment.test.ts:648-649` | Tracked `bun.lock` conflicts with assertion requiring its absence. Validate references before removing. | P01 |
| CI-03 | Medium | Run #45 job 66 | `tests/r3-phase04-ui-metrics-rbac.test.ts`, `tests/r4-phase03-sdk-deploy-auth.test.ts`, `tests/r5-phase01-mcp-foundation-logs.test.ts`, `tests/r5-phase03-mcp-ui.test.ts` | Each suite timed out with exit **124** despite reaching passing assertions; investigate open handles/teardown without changing application timers by default. | P01 |
| CI-04 | Medium | Run #45 job 66 | `tests/v2-phase01-storage-quotas.test.ts:788-804` vs `app/vcon/clients/page.tsx:15-20,70-95` and `lib/vconUiHelpers.ts:717-780` | Old regex expects `function isClientExpired(` in page; production page uses shared `classifyUiClientStatus` and `summarizeUiClientCounts`. Test contract is stale; not proof expiry feature fails. | P01 |
| CI-05 | Medium | Run #45 job 68 | Nine `tests/*.test.ts` files (listed below), `tsconfig.json:27` | `npx tsc --noEmit` produced **43 compiler errors**, despite Next.js production build PASS. Type errors in test sources require focused correction; do not disable strict TypeScript. | P01 |
| CI-06 | Low/CI | Run #45 job 67, run #48 job 74 | `.gitea/workflows/datastack-ci.yml` Python job | Linux Bullseye `apt-get` returned Debian-security 404; separate Windows Python job passed **14/14**. Runner provisioning defect, not SDK regression. | P03 |
| CI-07 | High/CI | Run #50 job 76 | `.gitea/workflows/datastack-docker-ci.yml`, Docker daemon; `docker/Dockerfile.web:13` | Compose validation and ingestion image PASS, then web image layer copy fails with containerd `lstat .../app/node_modules/@uiw: no such file or directory`. Root cause **unconfirmed** (runner snapshot/storage or reproducible build interaction); proxy never built. | P03 |
| CI-08 | Review | Run #50 job 76 | `package.json` / `package-lock.json` / resolved npm graph | npm reports **24 (23 moderate, 1 high)** with `--omit=dev`, **26 (25 moderate, 1 high)** with `--include=dev`. Counts overlap; no CVE list, reachable-exploit assessment or remediation done. | P03 |
*Severity is release-priority triage, NOT a CVSS rating and NOT proof of real-world exploitation.
### CI-05 exact file map (43 total, all inside tests)
| File | Error count | Families / main anchors |
|---|---:|---|
| `tests/phase01-auth.test.ts` | 4 | TS2540; 88,560,773,794 |
| `tests/phase03-storage-buffer.test.ts` | 2 | TS2349; 1158,1202 |
| `tests/r3-phase01-security-vault-webhooks.test.ts` | 6 | TS2353, TS2345; 185,191,202,210,295,430 |
| `tests/r3-phase02-storage-scheduler-gzn.test.ts` | 1 | TS2345; 49 |
| `tests/r4-phase01-security-boot.test.ts` | 3 | TS2345; 102,537,571 |
| `tests/r4-phase02-ingestion-audit-streaming.test.ts` | 9 | TS2345/TS2833; 87,332,335,338,407 |
| `tests/r5-phase02-mcp-server.test.ts` | 12 | TS18046; 510,524,538,549,560,570,581,604,613,635,644,657 |
| `tests/v2-phase01-storage-quotas.test.ts` | 2 | TS2554; 762,783 |
| `tests/v2-phase02-alerts-ip-prometheus.test.ts` | 4 | TS2339; 479,480,490,491 |
No source fix is authorized here. Use typed narrowing and correct test fixtures, not `skipLibCheck`, `any` everywhere, `@ts-ignore`, or changing real API responses merely to make tests compile.
## Three source-observed production reliability risks — CONDITIONAL GATES, not confirmed bugs
| Gate | Source proof | Why verification is required | Phase |
|---|---|---|---|
| R-01 Redis outage ACK durability | `server/index.js:165-193`, `server/socket/handlers.js:583-602` | `redis.rpush` failure falls back to RAM, and `onBufferPush()` can resolve, then Socket.IO ACK success; process crash before flush may lose acknowledged events. Fail-injection test and explicit durability contract required. | P02 |
| R-02 Batch replay duplication | `server/index.js:943-994`, `server/workers/csvWriter.js:265-323` | CSV write precedes Redis list trim. Crash/partial write between these operations can replay already written rows. Validate at-least-once vs exactly-once guarantee before mitigation. | P02 |
| R-03 Liveness ≠ readiness | `server/index.js:1939-1956`; `app/api/health/route.ts:95-111` | Health returns online without full PostgreSQL + Redis + disk transaction proof. Preserve existing `/health` API semantics; consider separate, internal readiness rather than breaking public health. | P02 |
Optional configuration review (not counted among eight): `server/index.js:1086-1089` Socket.IO uses CORS delegate; verify WebSocket origin/access and JWT guard in target deployments before recommending policy changes. `sdk/python/datastack/pyproject.toml:47-51` still references legacy `anik-d-art/datastack` URLs; metadata only, not current release blocker. Do not silently modify either under approved scope.
## CI evidence / original logs
- `https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/42` — initial Windows lockfile failure (job 63), cancelled after partial node evidence.
- `https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/45` — 24 suites = 18 clean / 6 fail-or-timeout, 43 TS diagnostics, Next.js production build PASS, Windows diagnostic SDK build PASS; Linux Python apt and Docker-CLI job blocked.
- `https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/48` — Python SDK 14/14 PASS.
- `https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/49` — full ESLint PASS.
- `https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/50` — Compose PASS, Docker ingestion image PASS, web image containerd failure.
- See `notes/006-BASELINE-AND-PATCH-EVIDENCE.md` for precise code/log excerpts and proposed patch anchors.
## Release acceptance rule
NOT production-update-ready until P01, conditional P02 gates, and P03 finish, 24/24 TypeScript suites exit 0, 14/14 Python tests pass, full strict `tsc --noEmit` and ESLint pass, Linux/Windows clean install is reproducible, standalone Next build passes, all 3 Docker images build, security advisories are triaged, and approved **non-mutating** live readiness checks pass. Production deploy is a separate operator-approved action; never automatic from this documentation phase.
## P01 Closure Appendix — 2026-11-22
**Implementation outcome: CI-01…CI-05 resolved within P01 source allowlist; no production app/runtime/UI/SDK changes.** Evidence: Gitea [#59](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/59) and focused quality retry [#60](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/60). Run #59 overall FAILED because a single test-only `stopTimers` type declaration remained; it was corrected in `tests/r5-phase01-mcp-foundation-logs.test.ts` and strict `tsc --noEmit` plus ESLint then PASSED in #60. The two run results are complementary; neither should be misreported as a single all-green run.
| Finding | Resolution and proof |
|---|---|
| CI-01 | `package-lock.json` gained 68 registry-integrity-verified **optional** entries including nested `@napi-rs/wasm-runtime/node_modules/@tybys/wasm-util@0.10.5`; 1293 original package entries unchanged, no removals or version bumps. Committed-lock `npm ci` PASS on Linux (job 90) and Windows (job 95). |
| CI-02 | Removed obsolete `bun.lock`; `tests/phase07-deployment.test.ts` exit 0. |
| CI-03 | Added suite-specific teardown hooks in four previously hanging suites, without changing core timer/runtime implementation; each exits 0. |
| CI-04 | Replaced stale client-expiry inline-function regex with shared classifier/count behavioral assertions; `tests/v2-phase01-storage-quotas.test.ts` exit 0. |
| CI-05 | 43 historical test-only TypeScript diagnostics corrected; one additional teardown declaration fixed after #59 typecheck failure. Final #60 strict TypeScript PASS (zero errors) and ESLint PASS. |
**Acceptance evidence:** #59 Node SDK build PASS, 24/24 isolated TypeScript suites exit 0 (no timeouts), Windows SDK build PASS, Next.js 15.5.29 standalone production build PASS with 22/22 pages. #60 targeted `tsc --noEmit` and `npm run lint` both PASS. Prior canonical Windows Python SDK 14/14 PASS from [#48](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/48); Python source unchanged and not rerun in P01. Docker images and live production behavior NOT verified in P01; P02 runtime reliability risks and P03 infrastructure/security gates remain open.
## P02 Forensic Fault-Injection Update — 2026-11-22
Source freeze for P02: Gitea/GitHub main `667a140c4e9e75382bfdcdbe1d3e9eb96f6e808a`, matching GitLab tracked tree `d53b9e6dd7ff6d291b8bab7b841d8684ef89c703`. R-01/R-02/R-03 originally **risks**, not established production incidents. The diagnostic-only P02 patch adds disposable fixture tests in `tests/phase02-sync.test.ts` (R-01/R-03) and `tests/phase03-storage-buffer.test.ts` (R-02); CI: https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/63. **Do not interpret diagnostic assertion success as a durability fix.** No runtime code, API, UI, data store, SDK, security policy, deployment or production host has been modified.
- **R-01 durable ACK:** `server/index.js:165-193,1895-1923` catches a failed Redis RPUSH and pushes accepted events into volatile RAM. `server/socket/handlers.js:583-602` then sends `{success:true,eventId}` if `onBufferPush` resolves. In the injected-RPUSH-failure fixture, simulated process-memory reset models loss of the acknowledged event; no actual server is killed. **Potential release blocker: acknowledged data is not necessarily durable.**
- **R-02 CSV/replay:** `server/index.js:981-993` and `core/data/buffer.ts:795-809` write CSV before Redis LTRIM. The fixture injects an LTRIM failure after successful CSV append and retries the same queue; a duplicate eventId write would demonstrate at-least-once rather than exactly-once delivery. This fixture is an analogous web-buffer implementation, **not direct Port-4000 writer fault injection**. **A release decision and exact remediation require independent targeted evidence; do not extrapolate no-duplicates.**
- **R-03 health:** `server/index.js:1926-1957` returns HTTP 200 `status:online` when Redis LLEN fails, while surfacing `redisConnected:false`; the historical route is **liveness**, not dependency readiness. `app/api/health/route.ts:95-111` likewise reports web liveness/buffer and does not prove database/Redis write readiness. A new readiness endpoint or altered public response requires separate approval.
Do not auto-fix source based solely on tests. Runtime code is READ-ONLY under the current approval. Any proven R-01/R-02 risk requiring behavior change needs a new exact method/file approval before application changes. P03 remains independent and unstarted.
## P02 Runtime Remediation Candidate — 2026-11-22 (NOT YET VERIFIED)
Authorized follow-up baseline: Gitea/GitHub `fd57a3518d14bcb8367ce9ab9c3ec306bcfc9898` (GitLab same tree). Local isolated branch `p02-runtime-remediation-20261122`, implementation commit `44eee8877e40d1683f44502c2a0ba3d437a03b88`. Scope: **server/index.js** (`pushEventsToRedisOrFallback`, `flushBuffer`), **server/socket/handlers.js** (sync_data/batch_sync ACK and claim rollback), **core/data/buffer.ts** (`flush`), **tests/phase02-sync.test.ts** and **tests/phase03-storage-buffer.test.ts** only, plus notes/001–006. All other source is unchanged.
**Candidate R-01 behavior:** when a configured Redis client returns an RPUSH error, `pushEventsToRedisOrFallback` retains RAM fallback but throws a sanitized `BUFFER_PERSIST_FAILED` instead of returning a durable-looking buffer count. Socket single/batch ACK returns `success:false`; best-effort Redis idempotency-key removal and bounded in-process negative-ACK marker handle ordinary retries. This is a **candidate** pending tests. When Redis is intentionally absent, historical RAM fallback is deliberately unchanged; it is not a universal durable-ACK guarantee. If Redis claim deletion fails and the server restarts, stale Redis idempotency claims could still misclassify a retry; a full crash-atomic claim/queue protocol is **not established** by this patch.
**Candidate R-02 behavior:** Port 4000 `flushBuffer` and Port 3000 `DataBufferEngine.flush` stream-parse existing CSV/CSV.gz partitions for same-client/date/event IDs before replaying any buffered Redis or RAM batch, dropping already-persisted IDs while retaining Redis queue until the write/check completes. Scan/read/parse exceptions fail closed before LTRIM. In-scope test adds a direct Port 4000 writer + Redis LTRIM-failure/recovery test and updates the existing web-buffer replay fixture. **Not proven globally exactly-once:** cross-process CSV writers outside the Redis flush lock and unknown archival/partial-corruption cases remain; scanning partitions on each flush also has real disk-I/O cost, requiring throughput evaluation before production promotion.
**Candidate acceptance:** one disposable Gitea CI with 24/24 suites, strict TS, lint, Linux/Windows clean npm CI and production build; direct Port4000 replay tests; exact allowlist/diff audit and three-remote tree parity. The Gitea MCP/host was unavailable on the implementation attempt, so this is **NOT PASSED** and the P02 phase remains **BLOCKED / NOT CLOSED**. No live deployment or runtime production mutation.
## P02 Final Acceptance Verification — 2026-11-22 (current superseding evidence)
Baseline published diagnosis: `fd57a3518d14bcb8367ce9ab9c3ec306bcfc9898`. Runtime candidate `76cd972bdeea9ef07b4b38e9d8b5b5ed3312ca5b` passed Gitea CI #66 (24/24 Node regression suites, Node SDK, strict TypeScript, ESLint, Next production build, Windows SDK). New final narrow patch `bf525f0d4e5e4781de7fddd2f5e7d3d602a80532`: `server/socket/handlers.js` plus two previously scoped TS tests only; final disposable Gitea CI #69 dispatched, terminal result to be recorded before phase closure.
Confirmed exact root cause in candidate: `server/socket/handlers.js` stores failed Redis persistence in `idempotencyMap` at `-Date.now()` while `cleanupMaps` deletes entries when `now - timestamp > 300000`; after the 60000ms cleanup window a failed marker can disappear despite an uncommitted Redis idempotency claim, permitting false-positive `DUPLICATE_DROPPED`. Arithmetic reproduction before code patch: at +61000ms, cleanup deletes a marker although Redis claim TTL (300000ms) is not over. Final patch uses a separate positive-timestamp failed-persistence marker and preserves negative ACK while the outstanding claim remains. A mixed batch with a failed duplicate must not return overall success while distinct records persist.
R-02: `server/index.js:843-897,1043-1058` and `core/data/buffer.ts:652-711,855-872` replay-scan existing same-client/day CSV, preserving Redis queue until a successful write/dedupe; fault tests include direct Port 4000 post-CSV LTRIM outage, rotated compressed .csv.gz containing quoted multiline payload and unrelated-date corrupt partition; malformed matching-date CSV must reject and leave Redis queue intact, with recovery after disposable fixture repair. Streaming parsing bounds memory, **not total disk I/O**; scan latency grows with matching partition size. No universal exactly-once guarantee, no live throughput claim and no claim of finite hard disk-I/O cap.
Public R-03 health remains historical liveness. Intentionally Redis-free RAM fallback and its historical successful ACK stay unchanged. No app/UI/auth/API schema/SDK/Docker/production-data/deployment changes. Work only in a new clean temp worktree; original PC repository's staged 16 P01 files and a separate pre-existing dirty candidate worktree preserved. No production readiness claim until CI #69 and final audit.
### P02 Final Focused Correction — CI #69 to #72
Gitea [CI #69](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/69) was run against `bf525f0d4e5e4781de7fddd2f5e7d3d602a80532`: the new Redis stale-claim test timed out because it globally replaced `Date.now` during live Socket.IO ACK scheduling. This is a **test-harness failure**, not a proven backend regression; other new CSV.gz, partial-corruption, mixed-new/durable and Redis-free regression cases passed. An additional source-grounded edge case was found: `batch_sync` previously failed to reject a batch containing a non-durable claim PLUS an already accepted duplicate when `processed=0, duplicates>0`. Under exact approved scope, the `server/socket/handlers.js` branch changed from `if (volatileDuplicate && processed > 0)` to `if (volatileDuplicate)`, ensuring false overall ACK is never sent for any such mixture. Test now uses local simulated TTL arithmetic and real-clock Socket.IO retries; no global clock manipulation. Corrected commit `acca8be01a31f8d3972564cbaec8fd3117a0b551` sent to [focused CI #72](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/72); still no P02 closure or production deployment until PASS.
### P02 definitive CI acceptance (2026-11-22)
Source-verified P02 final correction is `acca8be01a31f8d3972564cbaec8fd3117a0b551`. [Gitea CI #72](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/72) terminal **SUCCESS** (Linux 24/24 TypeScript suites, explicit R-01/R-02 fault cases, strict tsc, ESLint, Windows Node SDK, Next.js standalone build). Earlier #69 was cancelled after a test-only global `Date.now` Socket.IO ACK timeout; fixed by removing global clock override and adding direct arithmetic proof without changing timers. #72 proves the corrected test passes. Final source-path audit: exactly 11 approved paths (3 runtime, 2 tests, 6 notes). No keys/secrets, auth/SDK/UI/public health, dependency pins, CI workflows, deployment or database migrations changed. ACK remains **best-effort in intentionally Redis-free RAM mode**; Redis-configured RPUSH failure must return negative ACK; CSV deduplication guarantees only tested recovery windows, not globally atomic exactly-once. Partition scans are memory-streamed but disk reads scale with matching partition size, and production throughput is NOT certified. Release/installation still requires separate authorization.
## P03 production forensic acceptance — 2026-11-22
Baseline Gitea/GitHub `48fb277079b380fdbf1e58cd2da40afeed0b03ee`; GitLab baseline same tracked tree `41a169eec0c05ce19bc4acc29d7a8cfe1f8dd90d` (317/317 blobs). Final P03 workflow candidate `549d575653b68c29f97e2f78036646f2e2035719`. [Gitea CI #77](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/77): overall **FAILURE** because the initial Python-only checkout lacked Node (exit 127), **not** an SDK regression. Its other six jobs terminal **SUCCESS**: Node `CI_SUITE_SUMMARY total=24 failed=0`, strict TS+ESLint, Next standalone build, Windows SDK, Compose + isolated BuildKit ingestion/web/proxy image build `DATASTACK_THREE_IMAGES_BUILD_PASS`, read-only advisory inventory `DATASTACK_SECURITY_TRIAGE_INVENTORY_PASS`. Narrow [Python-only CI #78](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/78) terminal **SUCCESS**: Node-capable Bookworm container, Python 3.11 isolated venv, `Ran 14 tests in 3.959s`, `OK`, `DATASTACK_PYTHON_14_OF_14_PASS`. The other six jobs were deliberately skipped in #78.
**CI-08 security disposition:** `npm audit --json` full=26 affected packages (25 moderate, 1 high); runtime=24 (23 moderate, 1 high), **not counts of distinct advisories**. High-severity advisories [GHSA-6g55-p6wh-862q](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6g55-p6wh-862q), [GHSA-r28c-9q8g-f849](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r28c-9q8g-f849) affect Next 15.5.29's nested `postcss@8.4.31` despite patched root `postcss@8.5.33`; npm recommends major `next@16.4.6`. Direct `cloudcmd@19.24.0` carries moderate transitive issues (`dompurify`, `file-type`, `glob`, `minimatch`, `got`); npm recommends `cloudcmd@17.0.2` downgrade, not a verified safe pin. No speculative package pin, major upgrade or force fix; a separately tested compatible remediation is needed before release.
**Scope / release decision:** only `.gitea/workflows/datastack-ci.yml`, `.gitea/workflows/datastack-docker-ci.yml`, and `notes/001–006` changed. No `package.json`/lock, Dockerfile, application UI/UX, runtime, auth, SDK, database, Compose, production data, secret, shared Docker prune, deployment, migration, tag or release. P03 technical CI and advisory-triage acceptance verified by #77 non-Python jobs plus #78 Python; do **not** mislabel #77 overall as successful. Final phase publication requires one main commit and Gitea/GitHub/GitLab exact tracked tree parity. **Production release NO-GO** while runtime high advisory is unresolved; live production health, throughput and deployment remain unverified.
## P04-S01 blocked security reconciliation report
P04-S01 SEC-01 BLOCKED — 2026-11-22. Approved scoped `overrides.next.postcss=8.5.33` trialed in disposable Windows npm 10.9.8 workspace only. `npm install --package-lock-only` EXIT 0, but `npm ls --package-lock-only postcss --all` EXIT 1 (`ELSPROBLEMS`: Next nested `postcss@8.4.31` invalid; expected 8.5.33); npm dedupe also kept invalid dependency. Read-only `npm audit --omit=dev --json` EXIT 1, runtime high 1/moderate 23/critical 0. Lockfile regeneration caused unrelated churn (91 package entries added, 106 removed, 69 changed, including two lightningcss optional 1.33.0 -> 1.30.1). Fresh minimal Next 15.5.29 fixture with identical override resolves PostCSS 8.5.33, isolating failure to DataStack committed lock graph. `npm ci --dry-run` exit 0 does not prove real clean install. Exact stop rule applied: no dependency patch, no CI acceptance, no main commit, no GitHub/GitLab sync, no release/deploy; production NO-GO. Need separate explicit narrowly scoped lock reconciliation approval.
Root proof: `package-lock.json:10552-10560` Next pins 8.4.31; `:10602-10603` nested 8.4.31; `:11427-11428` root 8.5.33; advisories GHSA-6g55-p6wh-862q and GHSA-r28c-9q8g-f849.
## P04-S01B actual trial / release blocker — 2026-11-22
User explicitly approved P04-S01B stale-copy removal exception. In a clean disposable Windows npm 10.9.8 probe based on Gitea main `fac0934a00e6c15902738a3ffafb11b5ec2f0ac3`, remove ONLY the stale nested PostCSS 8.4.31 entry from the disposable lock copy and set `overrides.next.postcss=8.5.33`. `npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund --prefer-offline` exited 0; `npm ls --package-lock-only postcss --all --depth=4` exited 0 and Next 15.5.29 used deduped 8.5.33. Read-only runtime audit on the **unpublished candidate** showed high=0, critical=0, moderate=22 (22 affected package entries); SEC-01 candidate mitigation confirmed but NOT accepted. The regenerated lock changed **67 unrelated package metadata entries** (36 `dev` and 29 `libc` field changes plus dependency order-only differences), despite zero unrelated version changes, and removed only the stale node. This violates explicit metadata preservation. STOP before real `npm ci`, Gitea CI, security-gate edit or main/mirror publication. No production release or security-clean claim for published baseline.
## P04-S01C verified candidate / Windows acceptance outstanding — 2026-11-22
Approved deterministic lockfile reconciliation fixed the **SEC-01 Next 15.5.29 nested PostCSS 8.4.31** candidate without touching any unrelated package metadata, versions, hashes, URLs or feature/runtime sources. Scoping: `package.json` scoped `overrides.next.postcss=8.5.33`; `package-lock.json` only 26-line removal of obsolete `node_modules/next/node_modules/postcss`; existing Gitea `security-audit` job adds runtime high/critical failure. Generated lockfile with deterministic baseline metadata restoration had SHA-256 `e6b5b362877627085dc04c9ded03c019971e07ef9f4af1e78057d58961a1c091` and Gitea branch bytes matched exactly. No unrelated package entry/metadata delta (0 added, 1 removed, 0 changed). Gitea [CI #85](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/85) candidate `c759be990c032c2474d2d0bad519c643dec11a3a`: Node 24/24, Python 14/14, strict TypeScript + ESLint, Next standalone, Docker 3/3 and runtime advisory gate all SUCCESS. Runtime audit **22 moderate, 0 high, 0 critical**; full audit **24 moderate, 0 high, 0 critical**. **Windows compatibility job still QUEUED at checkpoint; overall CI not yet terminal accepted, main and mirrors unchanged.** Production remains NO-GO pending Windows CI, 3-remote sync, remaining moderate advisories/live health.
## P04-S01C FINAL CI acceptance (7/7) — 2026-11-22
Gitea CI #85 https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/85 COMPLETED/SUCCESS; tested implementation SHA c759be990c032c2474d2d0bad519c643dec11a3a; later changes to candidate are documentation only. All seven jobs terminal SUCCESS: node-regression (Linux committed-lock npm ci and exactly 24/24 TypeScript suites); python-regression (Ran 14 tests, OK); quality (strict tsc and ESLint); production-build (Next 15.5.29 standalone, 22/22 pages); docker-image-build (three isolated BuildKit ingestion/web/proxy images); windows-compatibility (Windows committed-lock npm ci and Node SDK build, job #182, terminal SUCCESS); security-audit (runtime moderate=22 high=0 critical=0; full moderate=24 high=0 critical=0; DATASTACK_RUNTIME_SECURITY_HIGH_CRITICAL_ZERO). Single Gitea acceptance run used, no additional broad reruns.
Scope: exactly nine approved paths: package.json scoped next->postcss 8.5.33 override; package-lock.json removes only old nested postcss@8.4.31 entry; existing .gitea/workflows/datastack-ci.yml security-audit job high/critical rejection; notes/001–006 evidence. Other package metadata, versions, integrity and resolved URLs match baseline. Next.js 15.5.29 and Cloudcmd 19.24.0 preserved. Final candidate package-lock SHA256 e6b5b362877627085dc04c9ded03c019971e07ef9f4af1e78057d58961a1c091 (verified byte-for-byte with Gitea). No API, auth, SDK, UI, application runtime, database, Compose, Dockerfile, tests or production data changes, deployment, migration, prune, tag, release.
CI fully accepted; publication not yet asserted in these pre-merge notes. Final phase CLOSED requires one squash merge of PR #5 into Gitea main and verified identical tracked content across Gitea/GitHub/GitLab; record actual new SHAs in terminal report. Production release remains NO-GO pending P04-S02 moderate vulnerability triage and separately authorized live readiness verification.