5.4 KiB
P05-OIDC-01 — Disposable Real Browser Authentication Architecture
Approved baseline: f423c696544f28a42d6a5d1ad0acfd88a3b6f56d.
Current status: CI-only source implemented; real user callback/session acceptance requires actual terminal Gitea evidence.
Source and trust boundaries
| Exact first-party file | Main function / why it exists |
|---|---|
.gitea/workflows/p05-oidc-acceptance.yml |
Only manual Gitea Docker job, installs Git before checkout, executes CI-only harness and always calls owned-only teardown; never auto-runs on untrusted PRs |
tests/ci/oidc_e2e/run.sh |
Numeric Gitea run-ID validation, refusal of existing fixed network/projects/volumes/.env, disposable P02 Compose startup with no host ports, CI-only loopback namespace and secret volume, invokes official API provisioning and Chromium test |
tests/ci/oidc_e2e/compose.owner.override.yaml |
Add first-instance ephemeral IAM_OWNER machine PAT only to the CI-owned API service; official P02 developer Compose unchanged |
tests/ci/oidc_e2e/provision.py |
request() restricted to localhost API + Host, validates issuer/discovery, creates real project/Account OIDC Web client and verified temporary human via official management/User v2 APIs, writes generated credentials to 0600 separate CI secret volume, suppresses secret/error-body logging |
tests/ci/oidc_e2e/browser.sh |
Disposable Playwright Chromium image installs committed Account npm dependencies and pinned Playwright v1.58.2 inside container, not local developer PC |
tests/ci/oidc_e2e/browser.cjs |
main() drives actual browser OIDC authorization, original Login V2 UI fields, Auth.js callback, authenticated ID/API/pages, anon/invalid callback negative checks and local session sign-out; no mock or injected sessions |
tests/ci/oidc_e2e/cleanup.sh |
Only owner-labeled browser/forwarder containers and secret volume are removed, then existing backend_cleanup.sh removes and verifies run-marked Compose/DB/bootstrap state; fail-closed on unverified cleanup |
tests/ci/oidc_e2e/{README.md,MINIFEST.md} |
Isolated harness guide, exact source ownership and constraints |
Exact runtime topology
The P02 backend routes ZITADEL at http://localhost:8080 and prebuilt official Login V2 at /ui/v2/login. The pre-existing CI compose.portless.override.yaml removes the developer's host loopback bind. This phase uses an isolated Docker proxy network namespace, with a run-owned TCP forward from namespace-local localhost:8080 to Traefik:80. Both the one-off provisioning container and the Chromium/Account runner share that private namespace; nothing listens on the Gitea host's port 8080 or 3000.
users/ui/src/lib/env.ts disallows HTTP issuer in production and permits only HTTP localhost when NODE_ENV=development. Running the unmodified Account Portal with next dev inside a disposable CI container is therefore intentionally a development-origin functional acceptance, not a claim of HTTPS/production security acceptance. users/ui/src/auth.ts has real NextAuth ZITADEL checks: ["pkce","state","nonce"], nonempty subject and token expiry guards; this phase does not edit them.
Identity/provisioning security
A first-instance IAM_OWNER service user is created only inside disposable ZITADEL during initial setup, with its PAT written to the run-owned bootstrap volume and a short expiry. This is not the existing IAM_LOGIN_CLIENT service token used by the official Login V2. The IAM_OWNER token is mounted read-only only to the provisioning Python container, not to Chromium. The test app/client secret and randomly generated password are transferred via a separate run-labeled volume read-only to Chromium, and neither logs nor Git contain sensitive values. The test user's email is a verified .invalid address, not a real recipient; owner token, identity client and user are destroyed along with owned Postgres/bootstrap volumes.
Verification contract
- ZITADEL 4 services live, exact isolated portless config, authoritative issuer and OIDC discovery
- IAM_OWNER PAT exists, official project/app/client/user APIs return valid required fields
- Chromium's real authorization navigation contains response_type code, matching client/redirect, S256 challenge, state and nonce
- Original Login V2 form receives the ephemeral username/password; browser follows a genuine authorization code exchange to the protected Account Portal
- Actual
GET /api/account/mereturns created subject ID and no-store, HttpOnly session cookie; protected page valid - Anonymous API + protected page rejected; tampered callback fails closed; portal sign-out returns unauthenticated API
- Always owned-only cleanup confirms browser, port forwarder, secret volume, Compose containers, network, DB and bootstrap credentials gone
Never equate a static source check, issuer/JWKS check or successful redirect with a successful interactive login/callback. MFA/passkey, Admin Console human sign-in, production TLS and custom source-built Login V2 runtime wiring are future explicitly approved phases.
References
ZITADEL official endpoints and bootstrap specification: https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/blob/main/cmd/setup/steps.yaml, https://zitadel.com/docs/reference/api/management/zitadel.management.v1.ManagementService.AddOIDCApp and https://zitadel.com/docs/guides/integrate/login-ui/username-password. Actual Gitea result: notes/P05-OIDC-01.md.