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ZitPlane P05-CI-01 - Gitea Actions verification architecture
Status: P05-CI-01 Run #81 overall FAIL; P05-CI-02 Run #83 3 PASS / 1 FAIL (Account, Login, Security pass; backend proxy host-port collision). CI-only portless source correction after Run #83 remains unverified. Full OIDC and runtime acceptance pending. Approved baseline: 7ecf53169776cc7f08af3dde6fe4b4492acf3ea1 (2026-11-22).
Exact job map
| Job | Runner / source | What PASS means | Not covered |
|---|---|---|---|
account |
ubuntu-latest, node:22-bookworm; users/ui/ |
Structural guard + npm ci, tsc --noEmit, Next standalone production build |
Real login/redirect, live Account Portal |
login |
ubuntu-latest, node:22-bookworm; auth/ui/v2/ |
Frozen pnpm install, Nx proto/client/login build and original Login unit suite | Interactive admin/password/MFA/SSO integration |
security |
ubuntu-latest, node:22-bookworm |
NPM and pnpm production dependency advisories at HIGH+ thresholds triaged by runner registry | License/legal or full application security proof |
backend |
ubuntu-latest, node:22-alpine; deployment/docker/compose.backend.dev.yaml read-only |
Docker daemon preflight, Python helper contracts, disposable ZITADEL stack, readiness, OIDC discovery and JWKS | Portal OIDC callback, MFA, live account session, production TLS |
All jobs use the previously seen Gitea standard ubuntu-latest runner label; no separate runner is created or installed. A failed runner capability is a BLOCKED gate, never a PASS. Docker job must not run from an untrusted pull request; the workflow is workflow_dispatch only.
Dependency/root cause fixes
auth/ui/v2/pnpm-workspace.yamlhas only the 3 actually imported packages. P03's originalpnpm-lock.yamlretains exactpackages:/snapshots:resolution graph; 4 missing-upstream importers were removed, 4 present importers retained.- Account Portal package-lock v3 generated using local
npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund --engine-strict, not an install/test/build. Root package manifest matches lock manifest. - Login CI sets up pinned pnpm
10.30.3, runs--frozen-lockfileand the upstream Nx dependency graph; no upstream UI/auth logic was modified. - Account CI uses
npm cionly from committed lock, plus TS + production Next build. No automatically loosened package versions or npm install fallback. - Security jobs audit dependency advisory metadata on the runner. Any failure is reported verbatim with severity/package/version; no blind package updates.
Disposable backend safety and behavior
The P02 Compose has a fixed named network zitplane-backend-dev-internal and loopback-only 127.0.0.1:8080. CI refuses to start if that network already exists. It generates independent random .env in runner checkout and uses unique Compose project name zitplane-p05-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}. A marker is written only after the network absence check; cleanup uses that exact Compose project, deletes its ephemeral volumes, and removes its temporary credentials. It never connects to auth.vib.tools, account.vib.tools or any production database.
tests/ci/oidc_discovery.py probes ready/discovery/JWKS inside disposable Docker network only, avoiding exposing admin PATs. OIDC full user-session acceptance is explicitly NOT VERIFIED: P05 does not provision a disposable confidential OIDC app, fake user or Session API script. A 200 readiness/discovery alone does not constitute user login, MFA, PKCE callback, protected account route or logout acceptance.
Future gates
- Document actual Gitea runner job results and exact failure/line in
notes/P05-CI-01.mdanddocs/P05-CI-01.md. - If any job fails, keep immutable logged evidence; fix only reproduced narrow defects with separate approval if outside P05 Scope Lock.
- Provide disposable OIDC client/user provisioning and Account Portal auth/session lifecycle tests in a narrow separately approved integration phase.
- Production Docker/Coolify/TLS and DNS are out of scope.
Reference: notes/P05-CI-01.md, docs/PHASES.md, .gitea/workflows/p05-ci.yml, tests/ci/.
P05-CI-02 Narrow Auth.js and CI additions
users/ui/src/auth.tscallbacks.session:const subject: string = typeof token.zitadelSubject === "string" ? token.zitadelSubject : "";explicitly narrows the JWT claim. Session still setsidonly when subject nonempty and OIDC access-token expiry is in the future.users/ui/src/types/next-auth.d.tswas not changed. This addresses Run #81'sTS2345(user.id: {}) without a cast or altered PKCE/state/nonce.tests/ci/account_negative.py+ Account job: anonymous identity API 401/no-store and protected route redirect; no fake logged-in account.tests/ci/oidc_discovery.py: issuer/origin/JWKS negative contracts plus actual disposable ready/discovery/JWKS. Tests are CI-only.tests/ci/advisory_triage.py: parse live npm/pnpm registry JSON into advisory IDs, package, affected range, patch availability. Prior high/critical failure threshold maintained; no dependency versions changed.- Backend CI: after safe Docker/network preflight and startup, write one marker in disposable Postgres database
postgres, restart its container, verify marker persists and ZITADEL becomes ready, then test OIDC discovery/JWKS. Always cleanup only the current CI Compose project and its volumes; failure must remain visible. - Corrected Alpine Git checkout from P05-CI-01 is exercised by the new run. Fixed name
zitplane-backend-dev-internalis a known isolation limitation: existing network triggers fail-closed instead of reuse. - No full interactive user login callback, MFA, Admin Console user session or production TLS verification; separate future scope.
Verified Gitea Run #81 and source follow-up
Initial dispatched commit 42b79362c13b9dbb07f85a58ad278742d91b1f5b. Two PASS: Login V2 frozen reproducible install, production build and 1219/1219 upstream unit tests; dependency advisory gate at high/critical only (18 moderate findings outstanding). Two FAIL: Account Portal TS2345 Auth.js session callback type mismatch; Alpine backend actions/checkout fallback Not found because Git missing before checkout. The Docker runtime and full interactive OIDC flow were not executed.
Pre-checkout Git install inserted in the backend workflow after this failed run; this is only a source fix until a future run actually passes. Reference docs/P05-CI-01.md for job numbers and notes/P05-CI-01.md for the next phase defect IDs. There was no second CI run or local test.
P05-CI-02 Run #83 final evidence and post-run portless exception
Gitea Run #83 on SHA c27fe3d3234d16375b962b88014cdd8733ab2fb4: three job PASS (Account npm ci/typecheck/build/anonymous 401 and protected redirect; Login V2 frozen/Nx build + 1219 tests; HIGH/CRITICAL security audit with 18 Moderate Login records and 1 Moderate Account package); Docker job FAIL after Postgres, ZITADEL API and prebuilt Login V2 reported healthy. Traefik proxy attempted to bind occupied runner TCP 8080. Always cleanup removed only job-owned containers, network and volumes; persistence and OIDC discovery were not reached.
Only after that run, a P05-scoped CI overlay at tests/ci/compose.portless.override.yaml set proxy.ports: !reset [], as documented by Docker Compose: https://docs.docker.com/reference/compose-file/merge/#reset-value. Every backend workflow Compose call now includes this override; a fail-closed effective-config probe rejects any inherited host port. The P02 Compose and application logic remain untouched. Post-run override has not been CI tested. New exact Gitea main commit is documentation/source only and must not be described as the tested Run #83 SHA.
Unresolved: one separately approved isolated backend re-verification cycle for the portless override, Postgres restart persistence and live OIDC/JWKS; distinct disposable authenticated OIDC/client/user + MFA E2E; targeted dependency-only security remediation of Moderate findings (no upgrades in P05-CI-02).
P05-CI-03 — backend-only disposable acceptance
This is a separate .gitea/workflows/p05-backend-acceptance.yml triggered manually on Gitea main. It does not schedule the previous Account/ Login V2/ security jobs again.
- A short Alpine Git prerequisite precedes
actions/checkout@v4. After checkout, only Python 3 stdlib and Docker CLI/Compose are installed in CI (not on the developer PC). tests/ci/backend_acceptance.shaccepts only a numericGITHUB_RUN_ID; derives a unique Compose projectzitplane-p05-<run-id>; refuses existing hardcoded P02 network, same project containers or volumes. An existing local.envor ownership marker also causes fail-closed.- The original
deployment/docker/compose.backend.dev.yamlis read-only;tests/ci/compose.portless.override.yamlremovesproxy.portsand JSON merged configuration explicitly rejects host publishing. This isolates the shared Actions Docker host from an occupied TCP 8080. - After source-level P02 unit contracts (CI only) and fresh ignored
.envcreation, a marker.p05-ci-ownedis created only after all collision/config checks. Thendocker compose up -d --waitruns official pinned PostgreSQL, ZITADEL API, Login V2 and Traefik images. Postgres/API/Login needhealthy, proxy needsrunning. - A synthetic marker row in disposable Postgres default
postgresDB is written then validated after a database container restart and Compose health recovery. - Existing
tests/ci/oidc_discovery.pyruns in a throwawaypython:3.12-alpinecontainer on the owned internal network, validates negative issuer/JWKS fixtures, real/debug/ready, exact OIDC issuer/metadata and a nonempty public JWKS. tests/ci/backend_cleanup.shis run by an always step: it must find an ownership marker before any Docker teardown; only its Compose project is removed withdown -v. Cleanup then checks that no owned containers, volumes or the fixed network remain. A missing marker means Docker was never started by this run and cleanup is not required; not a backend PASS.
This phase can verify local disposable backend runtime only. It cannot certify real account login, Admin Console session, MFA, global SSO logout, production TLS/Coolify or open Moderate package vulnerabilities. See docs/P05-CI-03.md for actual run evidence and notes/P05-CI-03.md for approval/scope.
P05-CI-03 verified runtime outcome — Gitea Run #86
Gitea manual backend-only Run #86, job #184, tested 03fb58954dec886128a4011b6121754cbcdd79ff; SUCCESS. The Git checkout, isolated acceptance and always-run cleanup steps all succeeded. P02 3/3 backend contract tests, combined portless config, four service health, disposable Postgres write/restart/read marker, local ZITADEL readiness, exact issuer metadata, OIDC discovery, nonempty JWKS and malformed-input contract checks each produced real PASS markers. The CI-owned network, containers and named volumes were removed; no host TCP 8080 binding remained. Docker v29.9.3 and Compose v5.7.2 used on the runner.
This confirms disposable backend acceptance, not ZITADEL Console user login, Account Portal positive/authenticated callback, real MFA, global SSO, production routing or Moderate advisory remediation. The original P02 Compose and official source/lock versions remain untouched. No repeated Account/Login build/test jobs ran in P05-CI-03. Runtime outcome recorded in notes/P05-CI-03.md and docs/P05-CI-03.md; final docs-only commit is not a new tested binary/SHA.
P05-SEC-01 — Independent frozen-build and strict dependency audit gates
Manual Gitea-only .gitea/workflows/p05-security-acceptance.yml has four independent jobs: Account npm ci/TypeScript/Next.js build plus anonymous negative route checks; official Login V2 pnpm@10.30.3 install --frozen-lockfile, Nx proto/client/standalone build and upstream Vitest regression; standalone Account production registry audit; standalone Login workspace production registry audit. Independent jobs prevent a remaining Moderate advisory from hiding build/test results.
Each registry job first runs npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high or pnpm audit --prod --audit-level high under set -eu to fail-closed on High/Critical. Then nonmutating JSON is collected, tests/ci/advisory_triage.py prints exact IDs/package/range/fix, and tests/ci/security_advisory_gate.py requires complete/count-consistent JSON and zero Moderate/High/Critical. Any Moderate is an actual failed gate, not a warning disguised as acceptance.
Only approved manifest and lockfile metadata were patched; original Login/auth/API/UI source, pnpm-workspace.yaml, P02 backend, Compose, real credentials and production unchanged. Two transitive glob/minimatch risks may remain because the root PNPM override configuration is outside Scope Lock and those require semver-major upgrades. See project/DEPENDENCY-SECURITY.md for the original 18+1 records and exact immediate parents; source state is not proof of advisory resolution until actual Gitea run.
P05-SEC-01 Run #87 terminal job results
Manual Run #87 tested 752d243. Account job #185 PASS; Login job #186 PASS (frozen pnpm, Nx Next 16.4.6 build and 1219 unit cases); Account security job #187 PASS at all levels with 0 findings; Login security job #188 FAIL on two Moderate glob/minimatch advisories (0 High/Critical). The strict tests/ci/security_advisory_gate.py did not suppress them, so overall run FAILURE is expected and correct. Full source/security acceptance remains blocked pending a separate narrow transitive dependency phase; no repeated run or application source change.
P05-SEC-02 — focused Login-only CI acceptance mode
Existing manual .gitea/workflows/p05-security-acceptance.yml now offers workflow_dispatch.inputs.login_only (default false retains the prior full Account/Login jobs). For this phase dispatch login_only=true, which conditionally skips account and security_account jobs; only login and security_login should execute. No production secrets or remote identity client.
login starts with CI-only python3 ../../../tests/ci/transitive_override_contract.py for the exact seven owned parent overrides and no affected glob/minimatch lock versions, then pinned PNPM frozen install, upstream proto/client/Login standalone build and full vitest --run regressions. security_login uses existing production PNPM HIGH/CRITICAL audit and independent JSON detail + zero Moderate+ gate; no suppression. Both jobs must conclude SUCCESS before declaring P05-SEC-02 accepted. The historical Account zero-vulnerability proof is Gitea Run #87, not retested in this focused phase.
A single manual run is authorized; Git source commit/push precedes dispatch, and final evidence-only documentation commit/push follows without a second run. Source-only audit and actual runner results are distinct; see notes/P05-SEC-02.md and docs/P05-SEC-02.md.
Run #88 and CI helper parsing defect — acceptance remains blocked
Gitea Run #88 source 66cfed5, exact tree 9a1d2abd, intentionally skipped Account jobs #189/#191. Login security #192 PASS (zero Moderate/High/Critical). Login build #190 FAIL before frozen install in transitive_override_contract.py due misclassification of existing >= version-range keys as parent-scoped overrides. Build/unit steps were skipped, not failed application regressions. Narrow post-run regex correction now explicitly accepts only >glob / >minimatch; unverified until a newly approved run. One focused run only; follow-up P05-SEC-02-A01 should run only Login frozen/build/unit with security gate, under a separately approved baseline.
P05-SEC-02-A01 — final frozen-build acceptance scope
Run #88 (66cfed5) proved strict Login production vulnerability audit 0 but did not execute frozen PNPM install, Nx standalone build or Vitest: new CI-only overridden() parser previously misread axios@>= etc. Corrected suffix-only >glob/>minimatch version is already committed at baseline 7655dbd; no further source/CI changes are planned.
One manual p05-security-acceptance.yml dispatch with login_only=true tests this existing code; Account build/security jobs intentionally skipped and previously accepted (Run #87). Login job: exact seven parent→child contract, PNPM v10.30.3 frozen install, Nx original proto/client/Login standalone build and upstream Vitest; Login security job: fail-closed live registry zero Moderate/High/Critical. No local tests/build/Docker or production usage; exact CI job outcomes recorded under notes/P05-SEC-02-A01.md. If a gate fails, this acceptance remains BLOCKED and no unapproved repeat run occurs.
P05-SEC-02-A01 terminal acceptance — Gitea Run #89
One manual Gitea Run #89 tested SHA ff4c58ed861474061c8f045be3a9f0752caf6ca0, 2026-11-22 16:30:28–16:34:54 UTC, overall SUCCESS. login_only=true skipped Account build/security jobs #193/#195, previously accepted in Run #87. Login job #194 SUCCESS: corrected exact seven-parent override source contract/lock matched (ZITPLANE_EXACT_SEVEN_PARENT_OVERRIDES_PASS, ZITPLANE_GLOB_MINIMATCH_PATCHED_LOCK_CONTRACT_PASS), PNPM 10.30.3 frozen installation (Lockfile is up to date, 1121 packages) PASS, official Nx proto/client/Login 16.4.6 standalone build/artifact PASS, upstream Vitest 84/84 test files, 1219/1219 unit tests PASS. Login security job #196 SUCCESS: fail-closed HIGH/CRITICAL gate PASS, production registry pnpm audit --prod 0 Moderate/High/Critical, ZITPLANE_PNPM_ZERO_MODERATE_HIGH_CRITICAL_PASS.
No new CI/auth/application/manifest/lock changes in A01; all checks were against the existing corrected validator. This closes the dependency-security/frozen-build acceptance only, not human OIDC login/callback, real MFA or production integration. See notes/P05-SEC-02-A01.md for exact markers/timestamps.
P05-OIDC-01 — Gitea-only real OIDC browser acceptance
New manual workflow .gitea/workflows/p05-oidc-acceptance.yml executes one isolated Docker runner job. tests/ci/oidc_e2e/run.sh creates the unchanged P02 stack under exact numeric run ownership and no host ports; a CI-only FirstInstance IAM_OWNER machine PAT and official API provision a disposable OIDC client/user. A pinned Chromium image runs the unmodified Account Portal in isolated CI development mode, driving official prebuilt Login V2 and real Auth.js PKCE/state/nonce, callback, authenticated Account API/page, negatives and local logout. An always() step calls tests/ci/oidc_e2e/cleanup.sh to remove only owned browser/forwarder/secrets and invokes audited backend owned-data cleanup. The run must fail if cleanup is incomplete; no browser secrets are logged/uploaded.
Important: The original backend external issuer is HTTP localhost, while Account Portal production mode correctly requires HTTPS. This CI development-origin browser acceptance does not certify production TLS, full self-hosted login source wiring, MFA or Admin Console human login. See project/OIDC-E2E-ARCHITECTURE.md for individual modules and notes/P05-OIDC-01.md for the actual run status.
P05-OIDC-01 real CI evidence: Manual Gitea Run #90 (tested cbcd60e) had healthy 4-service portless backend PASS, CI-only localhost:8080 namespace forwarder readiness FAIL, no disposable OIDC project/client/user or Chromium browser launched; always() cleanup job step PASS, no leftover CI resources. Overall job FAILED; not an authenticated login test PASS. Next narrowly scoped P05-OIDC-02 must instrument/repair private forwarder lifecycle and reverify the full browser acceptance, without changing original application or backend code.
P05-OIDC-02 scoped follow-up
New source in tests/ci/oidc_e2e/run.sh: test namespace-local Traefik proxy Host route before creating sidecar, resolve published alpine/socat:1.8.1.3 to immutable digest, validate prebuilt socat entrypoint, create no-host-port loopback sidecar, check running state/exit plus bounded private forwarded HTTP 200. provision.py now treats /debug/ready as HTTP status-only; official management provisioning and all browser/auth assertions unchanged. Existing manual Gitea workflow and always-run owned cleanup unchanged. One separate Gitea acceptance run needed; never mark a static stage check as an actual real OIDC browser PASS.
P05-OIDC-02 Gitea Run #91 result: tested 4831165, job #198 overall FAIL. All 4 services healthy PASS, no runner host port PASS, private Traefik:80 Host-route HTTP 200 PASS, prebuilt socat/digest verification PASS. The run-owned socat sidecar exited 1 before forwarded 8080 check, so no project/client/user or Chromium/Auth.js checks executed. Mandatory cleanup PASS, no remaining owned resources. Source-only status readiness fix in provision.py was not exercised. Root cause inside sidecar unproven without redacted startup error diagnostics. Next separately approved P05-OIDC-03 limited to private CI process/diagnostics.
P05-OIDC-03 approved CI-only source: The existing manual workflow is unchanged. Run #91's verified socat exit 1 justifies a single-run diagnostic attempt plus a one-time deterministic, digest-pinned python:3.12-alpine stdlib private forwarder fallback. Only run-labeled containers, 127.0.0.1:8080 → private Traefik:80, bounded error-class diagnostics and original proxy Host HTTP 200 gate are permitted. The diagnostic/fallback happens before real provisioning; no authentication, browser or cleanup source changed. A new single Gitea run must prove all real client/user/browser/callback/session and mandatory owned cleanup checks or remain BLOCKED.
P05-OIDC-03 queued CI evidence: The only approved Gitea Run #93 (source 7b80f411b2981e2274d171c12596301ed757b768) was still QUEUED at last inspection; job #206 has not started, so neither the socat diagnostic/Python fallback nor the browser/provisioning/cleanup ran. Do not mark technical failure/success; runner scheduling is a pending dependency, not a proven outage. Source audit passed, and no second dispatch occurred. Follow-up should examine the same Run #93 terminal steps/actual cleanup and update docs, not rerun prior suites.
P05-OIDC-03-A01 — existing Run #93 read-only queue audit (2026-11-23)
The existing p05-oidc-acceptance.yml manual workflow is active and declares one runs-on: ubuntu-latest job. Run #93 requested on 2026-11-22T18:08:45Z at tested SHA 7b80f411b2981e2274d171c12596301ed757b768 is still queued at the A01 read-only inspection. Job #206 is also queued with no actual start/completion times or steps; Gitea returned HTTP 404 job not started for its log. This is a scheduling/queue dependency, not a proved technical error in the new socat diagnostic, Python TCP fallback, IAM_OWNER API or browser/PKCE/session checks. No Run #93 authentication or cleanup gates executed.
Historical Run #91 used this workflow and reached a terminal job, but that only proves prior runner availability. The connected Gitea read tools contain no online runner/registration/label-capacity read endpoint; current ubuntu-latest runner availability is therefore unknown, and offline/mismatched/saturated runner or scheduler failure cannot be distinguished. No runner config, workflow, source, credentials or live system touched; no second dispatch. Full read-only ledger: notes/P05-OIDC-03-A01.md. Operator guide: docs/P05-OIDC-03-A01.md.
P05-OIDC-03-A02 — terminal existing Run #93 (supersedes queued snapshot)
Run #93 tested 7b80f411b2981e2274d171c12596301ed757b768, job #206 started 2026-11-22T18:36:26Z and completed 18:37:47Z with FAILURE. The manual workflow/runner job was scheduled and checkout/Docker executed; current runner availability outside this historical run cannot be established through available Gitea read actions. Four-service backend startup, no published host ports, exact private Traefik Host routing and pinned/digest image metadata passed. Socat exited 1 with SOCKET_BIND_ERROR, Python stdlib fallback image/digest/start attempt passed but its private IPv4 listener exited 1 with ADDRESS_IN_USE. Exact process holding namespace-local TCP port 8080 was not identified; the source Compose Traefik service is configured to listen on :80, while ZITADEL API listens in its own container namespace on :8080, so neither is proved to own the collided private socket. No official client/user provisioning, original Chromium Login V2 authorization, PKCE/state/nonce/Auth.js callback, protected Account session, negative auth or logout tests executed. Mandatory exact run-owned cleanup PASS on both expected markers. No workflow rerun/source change under A02. Full evidence: notes/P05-OIDC-03-A02.md, docs/P05-OIDC-03-A02.md.