Files
ZitPlane/tests/ci/oidc_e2e

P05-OIDC-01 — disposable Gitea-only real browser OIDC verification

Not for local development, production hosts, or real identities. The new .gitea/workflows/p05-oidc-acceptance.yml manual workflow is the only approved entrypoint, and it runs on a disposable Gitea Docker runner.

The environment is a temporary zitplane-p05-{GITHUB_RUN_ID} Compose stack containing the unchanged P02 PostgreSQL/ZITADEL API/official prebuilt Login V2/Traefik. compose.owner.override.yaml adds only a first-instance ephemeral IAM_OWNER machine PAT for official API provisioning, with a short expiration; compose.portless.override.yaml clears inherited host ports. A tiny run-owned TCP loopback-forwarder exists only in the proxy Docker network namespace to preserve the official P02 localhost:8080 issuer. No host port is published.

run.sh strictly refuses an existing fixed network, project, volume, credentials file or marker. provision.py uses the official API with a read-only temporary owner PAT to create an isolated project, OIDC Web authorization-code client and a verified disposable human with a strong random password; the app/user secrets are written with mode 0600 into a separate disposable volume. Admin PAT never reaches the browser runner. browser.sh installs the unchanged Account Portal using its committed npm lock and pinned Playwright 1.58.2 in a short-lived Chromium image, and invokes browser.cjs to launch the Account Portal with next dev inside the isolated CI container only. The HTTP loopback issuer is allowed in CI development mode but not in production. Do not claim HTTPS production topology was tested.

browser.cjs performs real native browser navigation, original ZITADEL Login V2 username/password, visible OIDC authorization code + PKCE S256/state/nonce request, Auth.js callback, nonempty matching subject in GET /api/account/me, protected Account page, anonymous/invalid-callback 401 negative tests and local Account Portal logout. No fake IdP, injected session cookies, mocked tokens or bypasses. It must reject failures rather than silently skip assertions.

cleanup.sh is mandatory always(): removes only run-labeled Playwright/forwarder containers and run-labeled secret volume, then invokes the pre-existing audited tests/ci/backend_cleanup.sh for the marked Compose project (including bootstrap PAT/Postgres), and verifies no owned resources remain. Failure of cleanup makes the CI job fail; never run it on a production host.

Privacy: never log user password, owner PAT, OIDC client secret, Auth.js cookies, codes, nonce, state, request query or screenshots. Browser diagnostics contain only safe stage IDs. No credentials/recordings uploaded as CI artifacts. The actual CI run and individual pass/blocked status are recorded in notes/P05-OIDC-01.md and docs/P05-OIDC-01.md; source existence alone is not runtime acceptance.

Phase limitations: MFA/passkeys, production HTTPS issuer, deployment, full Admin Console human login and global SSO logout are outside this phase. Only a real successful browser callback + verified teardown is enough for its narrower user/password OIDC acceptance.

P05-OIDC-02 private forwarder remediation (pending real Gitea CI)

run.sh first verifies private Traefik on 127.0.0.1:80 responds HTTP 200 with Host: localhost:8080, then pulls versioned alpine/socat:1.8.1.3, verifies prebuilt socat entrypoint, resolves the image's immutable digest and starts by digest in the same private proxy network namespace. No apk add inside container and no public host binding. A bounded health probe checks the listener/socket and exact Host/issuer route; on failure it logs only stage/state/exit/HTTP status, not secrets. provision.py readiness probes HTTP status-only; official IAM_OWNER project/client/human APIs and Chromium login unchanged. Run #90 never tested client/user/browser flows; next single Gitea run pending.

P05-OIDC-02 single-run evidence: Gitea Run #91 tested 4831165: private Traefik:80/Host HTTP 200 and versioned socat/digest verification PASS, then run-owned forwarder process exited with code 1. provision.py and browser.cjs not run. Cleanup PASS; no owned containers/network/credentials left. The status-only readiness change exists in source but is not CI-proven because the forwarder failed first. Startup errno/error class requires a new approved CI-only P05-OIDC-03 scope. No reruns under P05-OIDC-02.

P05-OIDC-03: forwarder diagnosis and same-run Python fallback

The official four-service P02 backend, original browser/auth and Gitea workflow remain read-only. Run #91 proved private Traefik/Host route PASS but socat process exited 1. Now a single run-owned socat start checks status/HTTP and classifies only safe startup error classes from pre-credential logs. When unhealthy, only the owned diagnostic sidecar is removed; its container name/owner label and private proxy net namespace are reused by official python:3.12-alpine pinned to its pulled sha256 registry digest. Only the tracked forwarder.py is copied; it transparently relays 127.0.0.1:8080 → 127.0.0.1:80 with no HTTP parsing, storage, external port or token access. Both must satisfy original issuer/Host HTTP 200 before project/client/user creation. The existing always() cleanup is unchanged. Full browser login/session acceptance requires actual Gitea result; source is not CI-verified yet.