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ZitPlane P05-CI-01 - Gitea Actions verification architecture
Status: P05-CI-01 Run #81 overall FAIL; P05-CI-02 Run #83 3 PASS / 1 FAIL (Account, Login, Security pass; backend proxy host-port collision). CI-only portless source correction after Run #83 remains unverified. Full OIDC and runtime acceptance pending. Approved baseline: 7ecf53169776cc7f08af3dde6fe4b4492acf3ea1 (2026-11-22).
Exact job map
| Job | Runner / source | What PASS means | Not covered |
|---|---|---|---|
account |
ubuntu-latest, node:22-bookworm; users/ui/ |
Structural guard + npm ci, tsc --noEmit, Next standalone production build |
Real login/redirect, live Account Portal |
login |
ubuntu-latest, node:22-bookworm; auth/ui/v2/ |
Frozen pnpm install, Nx proto/client/login build and original Login unit suite | Interactive admin/password/MFA/SSO integration |
security |
ubuntu-latest, node:22-bookworm |
NPM and pnpm production dependency advisories at HIGH+ thresholds triaged by runner registry | License/legal or full application security proof |
backend |
ubuntu-latest, node:22-alpine; deployment/docker/compose.backend.dev.yaml read-only |
Docker daemon preflight, Python helper contracts, disposable ZITADEL stack, readiness, OIDC discovery and JWKS | Portal OIDC callback, MFA, live account session, production TLS |
All jobs use the previously seen Gitea standard ubuntu-latest runner label; no separate runner is created or installed. A failed runner capability is a BLOCKED gate, never a PASS. Docker job must not run from an untrusted pull request; the workflow is workflow_dispatch only.
Dependency/root cause fixes
auth/ui/v2/pnpm-workspace.yamlhas only the 3 actually imported packages. P03's originalpnpm-lock.yamlretains exactpackages:/snapshots:resolution graph; 4 missing-upstream importers were removed, 4 present importers retained.- Account Portal package-lock v3 generated using local
npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund --engine-strict, not an install/test/build. Root package manifest matches lock manifest. - Login CI sets up pinned pnpm
10.30.3, runs--frozen-lockfileand the upstream Nx dependency graph; no upstream UI/auth logic was modified. - Account CI uses
npm cionly from committed lock, plus TS + production Next build. No automatically loosened package versions or npm install fallback. - Security jobs audit dependency advisory metadata on the runner. Any failure is reported verbatim with severity/package/version; no blind package updates.
Disposable backend safety and behavior
The P02 Compose has a fixed named network zitplane-backend-dev-internal and loopback-only 127.0.0.1:8080. CI refuses to start if that network already exists. It generates independent random .env in runner checkout and uses unique Compose project name zitplane-p05-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}. A marker is written only after the network absence check; cleanup uses that exact Compose project, deletes its ephemeral volumes, and removes its temporary credentials. It never connects to auth.vib.tools, account.vib.tools or any production database.
tests/ci/oidc_discovery.py probes ready/discovery/JWKS inside disposable Docker network only, avoiding exposing admin PATs. OIDC full user-session acceptance is explicitly NOT VERIFIED: P05 does not provision a disposable confidential OIDC app, fake user or Session API script. A 200 readiness/discovery alone does not constitute user login, MFA, PKCE callback, protected account route or logout acceptance.
Future gates
- Document actual Gitea runner job results and exact failure/line in
notes/P05-CI-01.mdanddocs/P05-CI-01.md. - If any job fails, keep immutable logged evidence; fix only reproduced narrow defects with separate approval if outside P05 Scope Lock.
- Provide disposable OIDC client/user provisioning and Account Portal auth/session lifecycle tests in a narrow separately approved integration phase.
- Production Docker/Coolify/TLS and DNS are out of scope.
Reference: notes/P05-CI-01.md, docs/PHASES.md, .gitea/workflows/p05-ci.yml, tests/ci/.
P05-CI-02 Narrow Auth.js and CI additions
users/ui/src/auth.tscallbacks.session:const subject: string = typeof token.zitadelSubject === "string" ? token.zitadelSubject : "";explicitly narrows the JWT claim. Session still setsidonly when subject nonempty and OIDC access-token expiry is in the future.users/ui/src/types/next-auth.d.tswas not changed. This addresses Run #81'sTS2345(user.id: {}) without a cast or altered PKCE/state/nonce.tests/ci/account_negative.py+ Account job: anonymous identity API 401/no-store and protected route redirect; no fake logged-in account.tests/ci/oidc_discovery.py: issuer/origin/JWKS negative contracts plus actual disposable ready/discovery/JWKS. Tests are CI-only.tests/ci/advisory_triage.py: parse live npm/pnpm registry JSON into advisory IDs, package, affected range, patch availability. Prior high/critical failure threshold maintained; no dependency versions changed.- Backend CI: after safe Docker/network preflight and startup, write one marker in disposable Postgres database
postgres, restart its container, verify marker persists and ZITADEL becomes ready, then test OIDC discovery/JWKS. Always cleanup only the current CI Compose project and its volumes; failure must remain visible. - Corrected Alpine Git checkout from P05-CI-01 is exercised by the new run. Fixed name
zitplane-backend-dev-internalis a known isolation limitation: existing network triggers fail-closed instead of reuse. - No full interactive user login callback, MFA, Admin Console user session or production TLS verification; separate future scope.
Verified Gitea Run #81 and source follow-up
Initial dispatched commit 42b79362c13b9dbb07f85a58ad278742d91b1f5b. Two PASS: Login V2 frozen reproducible install, production build and 1219/1219 upstream unit tests; dependency advisory gate at high/critical only (18 moderate findings outstanding). Two FAIL: Account Portal TS2345 Auth.js session callback type mismatch; Alpine backend actions/checkout fallback Not found because Git missing before checkout. The Docker runtime and full interactive OIDC flow were not executed.
Pre-checkout Git install inserted in the backend workflow after this failed run; this is only a source fix until a future run actually passes. Reference docs/P05-CI-01.md for job numbers and notes/P05-CI-01.md for the next phase defect IDs. There was no second CI run or local test.
P05-CI-02 Run #83 final evidence and post-run portless exception
Gitea Run #83 on SHA c27fe3d3234d16375b962b88014cdd8733ab2fb4: three job PASS (Account npm ci/typecheck/build/anonymous 401 and protected redirect; Login V2 frozen/Nx build + 1219 tests; HIGH/CRITICAL security audit with 18 Moderate Login records and 1 Moderate Account package); Docker job FAIL after Postgres, ZITADEL API and prebuilt Login V2 reported healthy. Traefik proxy attempted to bind occupied runner TCP 8080. Always cleanup removed only job-owned containers, network and volumes; persistence and OIDC discovery were not reached.
Only after that run, a P05-scoped CI overlay at tests/ci/compose.portless.override.yaml set proxy.ports: !reset [], as documented by Docker Compose: https://docs.docker.com/reference/compose-file/merge/#reset-value. Every backend workflow Compose call now includes this override; a fail-closed effective-config probe rejects any inherited host port. The P02 Compose and application logic remain untouched. Post-run override has not been CI tested. New exact Gitea main commit is documentation/source only and must not be described as the tested Run #83 SHA.
Unresolved: one separately approved isolated backend re-verification cycle for the portless override, Postgres restart persistence and live OIDC/JWKS; distinct disposable authenticated OIDC/client/user + MFA E2E; targeted dependency-only security remediation of Moderate findings (no upgrades in P05-CI-02).
P05-CI-03 — backend-only disposable acceptance
This is a separate .gitea/workflows/p05-backend-acceptance.yml triggered manually on Gitea main. It does not schedule the previous Account/ Login V2/ security jobs again.
- A short Alpine Git prerequisite precedes
actions/checkout@v4. After checkout, only Python 3 stdlib and Docker CLI/Compose are installed in CI (not on the developer PC). tests/ci/backend_acceptance.shaccepts only a numericGITHUB_RUN_ID; derives a unique Compose projectzitplane-p05-<run-id>; refuses existing hardcoded P02 network, same project containers or volumes. An existing local.envor ownership marker also causes fail-closed.- The original
deployment/docker/compose.backend.dev.yamlis read-only;tests/ci/compose.portless.override.yamlremovesproxy.portsand JSON merged configuration explicitly rejects host publishing. This isolates the shared Actions Docker host from an occupied TCP 8080. - After source-level P02 unit contracts (CI only) and fresh ignored
.envcreation, a marker.p05-ci-ownedis created only after all collision/config checks. Thendocker compose up -d --waitruns official pinned PostgreSQL, ZITADEL API, Login V2 and Traefik images. Postgres/API/Login needhealthy, proxy needsrunning. - A synthetic marker row in disposable Postgres default
postgresDB is written then validated after a database container restart and Compose health recovery. - Existing
tests/ci/oidc_discovery.pyruns in a throwawaypython:3.12-alpinecontainer on the owned internal network, validates negative issuer/JWKS fixtures, real/debug/ready, exact OIDC issuer/metadata and a nonempty public JWKS. tests/ci/backend_cleanup.shis run by an always step: it must find an ownership marker before any Docker teardown; only its Compose project is removed withdown -v. Cleanup then checks that no owned containers, volumes or the fixed network remain. A missing marker means Docker was never started by this run and cleanup is not required; not a backend PASS.
This phase can verify local disposable backend runtime only. It cannot certify real account login, Admin Console session, MFA, global SSO logout, production TLS/Coolify or open Moderate package vulnerabilities. See docs/P05-CI-03.md for actual run evidence and notes/P05-CI-03.md for approval/scope.