# tests/ci — Isolated Gitea verification tools This folder contains **CI-only** source/lockfile checks and OIDC discovery smoke support. Run these through the approved `.gitea/workflows/p05-ci.yml` on a disposable Linux runner. - `source_contract.py` checks the narrow P05 source/package constraints and paths. It is not a typecheck or application test. - `oidc_discovery.py` checks ZITADEL readiness, OIDC discovery, JWKS and fail-closed issuer/JWKS negative fixtures on the **disposable** Docker network. It does NOT log in a user or check an authenticated callback. - `account_negative.py` checks that an anonymous Account Portal call returns 401 and that a protected page redirects to `/signin`. It does NOT create a test user or prove real login. - `advisory_triage.py` summarizes available npm/pnpm registry advisory JSON with IDs, ranges and fixes, without changing dependency versions. - `compose.portless.override.yaml` is **CI-only**, adds `ports: !reset []` to clear P02's inherited Traefik host mapping. Run #83 failed because host 8080 was occupied; this post-run source correction is **not CI-verified**. Use both Compose files together and assert `proxy.ports` absent before startup. P02 dev Compose is unchanged. No real credentials or production domains are used. Never print bootstrap PATs, admin secrets, session cookies or `.env` contents. Cleanup of disposable volumes is mandatory; never apply `docker compose down -v` to a user's non-CI stack. - `backend_acceptance.sh` (P05-CI-03) is the manual backend-only Gitea runner preflight, portless Compose gate, four-service readiness, disposable database restart persistence and OIDC/JWKS smoke. Refuses pre-existing fixed network/project/volumes. - `backend_cleanup.sh` (P05-CI-03) is the workflow's `always()` cleanup script. It tears down only a marked run-owned Compose project and verifies that no project containers, volumes or fixed network remain. Unverified cleanup is an explicit failure. - Run from `.gitea/workflows/p05-backend-acceptance.yml` **only in isolated Gitea CI**, not on a production Docker host or local developer PC. **Run #86 PASS** on `03fb589`, including persistence and owned cleanup. No real user login/MFA E2E was run. - `security_advisory_gate.py` (P05-SEC-01) takes npm or pnpm registry audit JSON, rejects missing/errored/inconsistent metadata and requires **zero Moderate/High/Critical findings**. It is independent of the existing HIGH+ audit command and `advisory_triage.py` detailed advisory ID report. **Gitea Run #87** proved Account audit 0 and Login audit **2 Moderate** (`glob`, `minimatch`); strict Login gate correctly FAILED. Dedicated `.gitea/workflows/p05-security-acceptance.yml` is manual only; frozen installs/builds are CI-only and passed 1219/1219 Login unit regressions. - `transitive_override_contract.py` (P05-SEC-02) validates seven exact parent-scoped PNPM overrides, lock/importer consistency and absence of affected glob/minimatch versions. **Run #88 failed in this helper before pnpm frozen install** because its first regex also matched existing `>=` version-range override keys. Post-run regex restricted to `>glob`/`>minimatch` parent selectors, **not CI-tested**; next separately approved focused run required. The independent Run #88 live production advisory audit found 0 Moderate/High/Critical. Account jobs skipped as expected with `login_only=true`. Add new CI checks and update `MINIFEST.md`, `project/`, `docs/`, and `notes/` in the same approved phase.