# ZitPlane P05-CI-01 - Gitea Actions verification architecture **Status:** P05-CI-01 Run #81 overall FAIL; P05-CI-02 Run #83 **3 PASS / 1 FAIL** (Account, Login, Security pass; backend proxy host-port collision). CI-only portless source correction after Run #83 remains unverified. Full OIDC and runtime acceptance pending. **Approved baseline:** `7ecf53169776cc7f08af3dde6fe4b4492acf3ea1` (2026-11-22). ## Exact job map | Job | Runner / source | What PASS means | Not covered | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `account` | `ubuntu-latest`, `node:22-bookworm`; `users/ui/` | Structural guard + `npm ci`, `tsc --noEmit`, Next standalone production build | Real login/redirect, live Account Portal | | `login` | `ubuntu-latest`, `node:22-bookworm`; `auth/ui/v2/` | Frozen pnpm install, Nx proto/client/login build and original Login unit suite | Interactive admin/password/MFA/SSO integration | | `security` | `ubuntu-latest`, `node:22-bookworm` | NPM and pnpm production dependency advisories at HIGH+ thresholds triaged by runner registry | License/legal or full application security proof | | `backend` | `ubuntu-latest`, `node:22-alpine`; `deployment/docker/compose.backend.dev.yaml` read-only | Docker daemon preflight, Python helper contracts, disposable ZITADEL stack, readiness, OIDC discovery and JWKS | Portal OIDC callback, MFA, live account session, production TLS | All jobs use the previously seen Gitea standard `ubuntu-latest` runner label; no separate runner is created or installed. A failed runner capability is a **BLOCKED** gate, never a PASS. Docker job must not run from an untrusted pull request; the workflow is `workflow_dispatch` only. ## Dependency/root cause fixes - `auth/ui/v2/pnpm-workspace.yaml` has only the 3 actually imported packages. P03's original `pnpm-lock.yaml` retains exact `packages:/snapshots:` resolution graph; 4 missing-upstream importers were removed, 4 present importers retained. - Account Portal package-lock v3 generated using local `npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund --engine-strict`, **not** an install/test/build. Root package manifest matches lock manifest. - Login CI sets up pinned pnpm `10.30.3`, runs `--frozen-lockfile` and the upstream Nx dependency graph; no upstream UI/auth logic was modified. - Account CI uses `npm ci` only from committed lock, plus TS + production Next build. No automatically loosened package versions or npm install fallback. - Security jobs audit dependency advisory metadata on the runner. Any failure is reported verbatim with severity/package/version; no blind package updates. ## Disposable backend safety and behavior The P02 Compose has a fixed named network `zitplane-backend-dev-internal` and loopback-only `127.0.0.1:8080`. CI **refuses** to start if that network already exists. It generates independent random `.env` in runner checkout and uses unique Compose project name `zitplane-p05-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}`. A marker is written only after the network absence check; cleanup uses that exact Compose project, deletes its ephemeral volumes, and removes its temporary credentials. It never connects to `auth.vib.tools`, `account.vib.tools` or any production database. `tests/ci/oidc_discovery.py` probes ready/discovery/JWKS inside disposable Docker network only, avoiding exposing admin PATs. **OIDC full user-session acceptance is explicitly NOT VERIFIED**: P05 does not provision a disposable confidential OIDC app, fake user or Session API script. A 200 readiness/discovery alone does not constitute user login, MFA, PKCE callback, protected account route or logout acceptance. ## Future gates 1. Document actual Gitea runner job results and exact failure/line in `notes/P05-CI-01.md` and `docs/P05-CI-01.md`. 2. If any job fails, keep immutable logged evidence; fix only reproduced narrow defects with separate approval if outside P05 Scope Lock. 3. Provide disposable OIDC client/user provisioning and Account Portal auth/session lifecycle tests in a narrow separately approved integration phase. 4. Production Docker/Coolify/TLS and DNS are out of scope. Reference: `notes/P05-CI-01.md`, `docs/PHASES.md`, `.gitea/workflows/p05-ci.yml`, `tests/ci/`. ## P05-CI-02 Narrow Auth.js and CI additions - `users/ui/src/auth.ts` `callbacks.session`: `const subject: string = typeof token.zitadelSubject === "string" ? token.zitadelSubject : "";` explicitly narrows the JWT claim. Session still sets `id` only when subject nonempty and OIDC access-token expiry is in the future. `users/ui/src/types/next-auth.d.ts` was not changed. This addresses Run #81's `TS2345` (`user.id: {}`) without a cast or altered PKCE/state/nonce. - `tests/ci/account_negative.py` + Account job: anonymous identity API 401/no-store and protected route redirect; no fake logged-in account. `tests/ci/oidc_discovery.py`: issuer/origin/JWKS negative contracts plus actual disposable ready/discovery/JWKS. Tests are CI-only. - `tests/ci/advisory_triage.py`: parse live npm/pnpm registry JSON into advisory IDs, package, affected range, patch availability. Prior high/critical failure threshold maintained; no dependency versions changed. - Backend CI: after safe Docker/network preflight and startup, write one marker in **disposable Postgres database `postgres`**, restart its container, verify marker persists and ZITADEL becomes ready, then test OIDC discovery/JWKS. Always cleanup only the current CI Compose project and its volumes; failure must remain visible. - Corrected Alpine Git checkout from P05-CI-01 is exercised by the new run. Fixed name `zitplane-backend-dev-internal` is a known isolation limitation: existing network triggers fail-closed instead of reuse. - No full interactive user login callback, MFA, Admin Console user session or production TLS verification; separate future scope. ## Verified Gitea Run #81 and source follow-up Initial dispatched commit `42b79362c13b9dbb07f85a58ad278742d91b1f5b`. Two PASS: Login V2 frozen reproducible install, production build and 1219/1219 upstream unit tests; dependency advisory gate at high/critical only (18 moderate findings outstanding). Two FAIL: Account Portal TS2345 Auth.js session callback type mismatch; Alpine backend actions/checkout fallback `Not found` because Git missing before checkout. The Docker runtime and full interactive OIDC flow **were not executed**. Pre-checkout Git install inserted in the backend workflow after this failed run; this is only a **source fix** until a future run actually passes. Reference `docs/P05-CI-01.md` for job numbers and `notes/P05-CI-01.md` for the next phase defect IDs. There was no second CI run or local test. ## P05-CI-02 Run #83 final evidence and post-run portless exception Gitea [Run #83](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/ZitPlane/actions/runs/83) on SHA `c27fe3d3234d16375b962b88014cdd8733ab2fb4`: three job PASS (Account `npm ci`/typecheck/build/anonymous 401 and protected redirect; Login V2 frozen/Nx build + **1219 tests**; HIGH/CRITICAL security audit with 18 Moderate Login records and 1 Moderate Account package); Docker job FAIL after Postgres, ZITADEL API and prebuilt Login V2 reported healthy. Traefik proxy attempted to bind occupied runner TCP 8080. Always cleanup removed only job-owned containers, network and volumes; persistence and OIDC discovery were not reached. **Only after that run**, a P05-scoped CI overlay at `tests/ci/compose.portless.override.yaml` set `proxy.ports: !reset []`, as documented by Docker Compose: https://docs.docker.com/reference/compose-file/merge/#reset-value. Every backend workflow Compose call now includes this override; a fail-closed effective-config probe rejects any inherited host port. The P02 Compose and application logic remain untouched. **Post-run override has not been CI tested.** New exact Gitea main commit is documentation/source only and must not be described as the tested Run #83 SHA. Unresolved: one separately approved isolated backend re-verification cycle for the portless override, Postgres restart persistence and live OIDC/JWKS; distinct disposable authenticated OIDC/client/user + MFA E2E; targeted dependency-only security remediation of Moderate findings (no upgrades in P05-CI-02). ## P05-CI-03 — backend-only disposable acceptance This is a **separate** `.gitea/workflows/p05-backend-acceptance.yml` triggered manually on Gitea `main`. It does not schedule the previous Account/ Login V2/ security jobs again. - A short Alpine Git prerequisite precedes `actions/checkout@v4`. After checkout, only Python 3 stdlib and Docker CLI/Compose are installed in CI (not on the developer PC). - `tests/ci/backend_acceptance.sh` accepts only a numeric `GITHUB_RUN_ID`; derives a unique Compose project `zitplane-p05-`; refuses existing hardcoded P02 network, same project containers or volumes. An existing local `.env` or ownership marker also causes fail-closed. - The original `deployment/docker/compose.backend.dev.yaml` is read-only; `tests/ci/compose.portless.override.yaml` removes `proxy.ports` and JSON merged configuration explicitly rejects host publishing. This isolates the shared Actions Docker host from an occupied TCP 8080. - After source-level P02 unit contracts (CI only) and fresh ignored `.env` creation, a marker `.p05-ci-owned` is created **only after** all collision/config checks. Then `docker compose up -d --wait` runs official pinned PostgreSQL, ZITADEL API, Login V2 and Traefik images. Postgres/API/Login need `healthy`, proxy needs `running`. - A synthetic marker row in disposable Postgres default `postgres` DB is written then validated after a database container restart and Compose health recovery. - Existing `tests/ci/oidc_discovery.py` runs in a throwaway `python:3.12-alpine` container on the owned internal network, validates negative issuer/JWKS fixtures, real `/debug/ready`, exact OIDC issuer/metadata and a nonempty public JWKS. - `tests/ci/backend_cleanup.sh` is run by an **always** step: it must find an ownership marker before any Docker teardown; only its Compose project is removed with `down -v`. Cleanup then checks that no owned containers, volumes or the fixed network remain. A missing marker means Docker was never started by this run and cleanup is not required; **not** a backend PASS. This phase can verify local disposable backend runtime only. It **cannot** certify real account login, Admin Console session, MFA, global SSO logout, production TLS/Coolify or open Moderate package vulnerabilities. See `docs/P05-CI-03.md` for actual run evidence and `notes/P05-CI-03.md` for approval/scope. ## P05-CI-03 verified runtime outcome — Gitea Run #86 Gitea manual backend-only [Run #86](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/ZitPlane/actions/runs/86), job #184, tested `03fb58954dec886128a4011b6121754cbcdd79ff`; **SUCCESS**. The Git checkout, isolated acceptance and always-run cleanup steps all succeeded. P02 3/3 backend contract tests, combined portless config, four service health, disposable Postgres write/restart/read marker, local ZITADEL readiness, exact issuer metadata, OIDC discovery, nonempty JWKS and malformed-input contract checks each produced real PASS markers. The CI-owned network, containers and named volumes were removed; no host TCP 8080 binding remained. Docker v29.9.3 and Compose v5.7.2 used on the runner. This confirms **disposable backend acceptance**, not ZITADEL Console user login, Account Portal positive/authenticated callback, real MFA, global SSO, production routing or Moderate advisory remediation. The original P02 Compose and official source/lock versions remain untouched. No repeated Account/Login build/test jobs ran in P05-CI-03. Runtime outcome recorded in `notes/P05-CI-03.md` and `docs/P05-CI-03.md`; final docs-only commit is not a new tested binary/SHA. ## P05-SEC-01 — Independent frozen-build and strict dependency audit gates Manual Gitea-only `.gitea/workflows/p05-security-acceptance.yml` has four independent jobs: Account `npm ci`/TypeScript/Next.js build plus anonymous negative route checks; official Login V2 `pnpm@10.30.3 install --frozen-lockfile`, Nx proto/client/standalone build and upstream Vitest regression; standalone Account production registry audit; standalone Login workspace production registry audit. Independent jobs prevent a remaining Moderate advisory from hiding build/test results. Each registry job first runs `npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high` or `pnpm audit --prod --audit-level high` under `set -eu` to fail-closed on High/Critical. Then nonmutating JSON is collected, `tests/ci/advisory_triage.py` prints exact IDs/package/range/fix, and `tests/ci/security_advisory_gate.py` requires complete/count-consistent JSON and **zero Moderate/High/Critical**. Any Moderate is an actual failed gate, not a warning disguised as acceptance. Only approved manifest and lockfile metadata were patched; original Login/auth/API/UI source, `pnpm-workspace.yaml`, P02 backend, Compose, real credentials and production unchanged. Two transitive glob/minimatch risks may remain because the root PNPM override configuration is outside Scope Lock and those require semver-major upgrades. See `project/DEPENDENCY-SECURITY.md` for the original 18+1 records and exact immediate parents; source state is not proof of advisory resolution until actual Gitea run. ## P05-SEC-01 Run #87 terminal job results Manual [Run #87](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/ZitPlane/actions/runs/87) tested `752d243`. Account job #185 PASS; Login job #186 PASS (frozen pnpm, Nx Next 16.4.6 build and 1219 unit cases); Account security job #187 PASS at all levels with 0 findings; Login security job #188 FAIL on **two Moderate** `glob`/`minimatch` advisories (0 High/Critical). The strict `tests/ci/security_advisory_gate.py` did not suppress them, so **overall run FAILURE** is expected and correct. Full source/security acceptance remains blocked pending a separate narrow transitive dependency phase; no repeated run or application source change. ## P05-SEC-02 — focused Login-only CI acceptance mode Existing manual `.gitea/workflows/p05-security-acceptance.yml` now offers `workflow_dispatch.inputs.login_only` (default false retains the prior full Account/Login jobs). For **this** phase dispatch **`login_only=true`**, which conditionally skips `account` and `security_account` jobs; only `login` and `security_login` should execute. No production secrets or remote identity client. `login` starts with CI-only `python3 ../../../tests/ci/transitive_override_contract.py` for the exact seven owned parent overrides and no affected glob/minimatch lock versions, then pinned PNPM frozen install, upstream proto/client/Login standalone build and full `vitest --run` regressions. `security_login` uses existing production PNPM HIGH/CRITICAL audit and independent JSON detail + zero Moderate+ gate; **no suppression**. Both jobs must conclude SUCCESS before declaring P05-SEC-02 accepted. The historical Account zero-vulnerability proof is Gitea Run #87, **not retested** in this focused phase. A single manual run is authorized; Git source commit/push precedes dispatch, and final evidence-only documentation commit/push follows without a second run. Source-only audit and actual runner results are distinct; see `notes/P05-SEC-02.md` and `docs/P05-SEC-02.md`. ## Run #88 and CI helper parsing defect — acceptance remains blocked Gitea Run #88 source `66cfed5`, exact tree `9a1d2abd`, intentionally skipped Account jobs #189/#191. Login security #192 **PASS** (zero Moderate/High/Critical). Login build #190 **FAIL before frozen install** in `transitive_override_contract.py` due misclassification of existing `>=` version-range keys as parent-scoped overrides. Build/unit steps were **skipped**, not failed application regressions. Narrow post-run regex correction now explicitly accepts only `>glob` / `>minimatch`; **unverified until a newly approved run**. One focused run only; follow-up P05-SEC-02-A01 should run *only* Login frozen/build/unit with security gate, under a separately approved baseline. ## P05-SEC-02-A01 — final frozen-build acceptance scope Run #88 (`66cfed5`) proved strict Login production vulnerability audit 0 but *did not execute* frozen PNPM install, Nx standalone build or Vitest: new CI-only `overridden()` parser previously misread `axios@>=` etc. Corrected suffix-only `>glob`/`>minimatch` version is already committed at baseline `7655dbd`; no further source/CI changes are planned. One manual `p05-security-acceptance.yml` dispatch with `login_only=true` tests this existing code; Account build/security jobs intentionally skipped and previously accepted (Run #87). Login job: exact seven parent→child contract, PNPM v10.30.3 frozen install, Nx original proto/client/Login standalone build and upstream Vitest; Login security job: fail-closed live registry zero Moderate/High/Critical. No local tests/build/Docker or production usage; exact CI job outcomes recorded under `notes/P05-SEC-02-A01.md`. If a gate fails, this acceptance remains BLOCKED and no unapproved repeat run occurs. ## P05-SEC-02-A01 terminal acceptance — Gitea Run #89 **One** manual Gitea [Run #89](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/ZitPlane/actions/runs/89) tested SHA `ff4c58ed861474061c8f045be3a9f0752caf6ca0`, 2026-11-22 16:30:28–16:34:54 UTC, **overall SUCCESS**. `login_only=true` skipped Account build/security jobs #193/#195, previously accepted in Run #87. Login job #194 **SUCCESS**: corrected exact seven-parent override source contract/lock matched (`ZITPLANE_EXACT_SEVEN_PARENT_OVERRIDES_PASS`, `ZITPLANE_GLOB_MINIMATCH_PATCHED_LOCK_CONTRACT_PASS`), PNPM 10.30.3 frozen installation (`Lockfile is up to date`, 1121 packages) PASS, official Nx proto/client/Login 16.4.6 standalone build/artifact PASS, upstream Vitest **84/84 test files, 1219/1219 unit tests PASS**. Login security job #196 **SUCCESS**: fail-closed HIGH/CRITICAL gate PASS, production registry `pnpm audit --prod` **0 Moderate/High/Critical**, `ZITPLANE_PNPM_ZERO_MODERATE_HIGH_CRITICAL_PASS`. No new CI/auth/application/manifest/lock changes in A01; all checks were against the existing corrected validator. This closes the dependency-security/frozen-build acceptance only, **not** human OIDC login/callback, real MFA or production integration. See `notes/P05-SEC-02-A01.md` for exact markers/timestamps. ## P05-OIDC-01 — Gitea-only real OIDC browser acceptance New manual workflow `.gitea/workflows/p05-oidc-acceptance.yml` executes **one** isolated Docker runner job. `tests/ci/oidc_e2e/run.sh` creates the unchanged P02 stack under exact numeric run ownership and no host ports; a CI-only FirstInstance IAM_OWNER machine PAT and official API provision a disposable OIDC client/user. A pinned Chromium image runs the **unmodified** Account Portal in isolated CI development mode, driving official prebuilt Login V2 and real Auth.js PKCE/state/nonce, callback, authenticated Account API/page, negatives and local logout. An `always()` step calls `tests/ci/oidc_e2e/cleanup.sh` to remove only owned browser/forwarder/secrets and invokes audited backend owned-data cleanup. The run must fail if cleanup is incomplete; no browser secrets are logged/uploaded. **Important:** The original backend external issuer is HTTP localhost, while Account Portal production mode correctly requires HTTPS. This **CI development-origin** browser acceptance does not certify production TLS, full self-hosted login source wiring, MFA or Admin Console human login. See `project/OIDC-E2E-ARCHITECTURE.md` for individual modules and `notes/P05-OIDC-01.md` for the actual run status.