# P05-OIDC-01 — disposable Gitea-only real browser OIDC verification **Not for local development, production hosts, or real identities.** The new `.gitea/workflows/p05-oidc-acceptance.yml` manual workflow is the only approved entrypoint, and it runs on a disposable Gitea Docker runner. The environment is a temporary `zitplane-p05-{GITHUB_RUN_ID}` Compose stack containing the **unchanged** P02 PostgreSQL/ZITADEL API/official prebuilt Login V2/Traefik. `compose.owner.override.yaml` adds **only** a first-instance ephemeral `IAM_OWNER` machine PAT for official API provisioning, with a short expiration; `compose.portless.override.yaml` clears inherited host ports. A tiny run-owned TCP loopback-forwarder exists only in the proxy Docker network namespace to preserve the official P02 `localhost:8080` issuer. No host port is published. `run.sh` strictly refuses an existing fixed network, project, volume, credentials file or marker. `provision.py` uses the official API with a read-only temporary owner PAT to create an isolated project, OIDC Web authorization-code client and a verified disposable human with a strong random password; the app/user secrets are written with mode `0600` into **a separate disposable volume**. Admin PAT never reaches the browser runner. `browser.sh` installs the **unchanged** Account Portal using its committed npm lock and pinned Playwright 1.58.2 in a short-lived Chromium image, and invokes `browser.cjs` to launch the Account Portal with `next dev` **inside the isolated CI container only**. The HTTP loopback issuer is allowed in CI development mode but **not** in production. Do not claim HTTPS production topology was tested. `browser.cjs` performs real native browser navigation, original ZITADEL Login V2 username/password, visible OIDC authorization code + PKCE S256/state/nonce request, Auth.js callback, nonempty matching subject in `GET /api/account/me`, protected Account page, anonymous/invalid-callback 401 negative tests and local Account Portal logout. No fake IdP, injected session cookies, mocked tokens or bypasses. It must reject failures rather than silently skip assertions. `cleanup.sh` is mandatory `always()`: removes **only** run-labeled Playwright/forwarder containers and run-labeled secret volume, then invokes the pre-existing audited `tests/ci/backend_cleanup.sh` for the marked Compose project (including bootstrap PAT/Postgres), and verifies no owned resources remain. Failure of cleanup makes the CI job fail; never run it on a production host. **Privacy:** never log user password, owner PAT, OIDC client secret, Auth.js cookies, codes, nonce, state, request query or screenshots. Browser diagnostics contain only safe stage IDs. No credentials/recordings uploaded as CI artifacts. The actual CI run and individual pass/blocked status are recorded in `notes/P05-OIDC-01.md` and `docs/P05-OIDC-01.md`; source existence alone is not runtime acceptance. **Phase limitations:** MFA/passkeys, production HTTPS issuer, deployment, full Admin Console human login and global SSO logout are outside this phase. Only a real successful browser callback + verified teardown is enough for its narrower user/password OIDC acceptance. ## P05-OIDC-02 private forwarder remediation (pending real Gitea CI) `run.sh` first verifies private Traefik on 127.0.0.1:80 responds HTTP 200 with `Host: localhost:8080`, then pulls versioned `alpine/socat:1.8.1.3`, verifies prebuilt socat entrypoint, resolves the image's immutable digest and starts by digest in the same private proxy network namespace. No `apk add` inside container and no public host binding. A bounded health probe checks the listener/socket and exact Host/issuer route; on failure it logs only stage/state/exit/HTTP status, not secrets. `provision.py` readiness probes HTTP status-only; official IAM_OWNER project/client/human APIs and Chromium login unchanged. Run #90 never tested client/user/browser flows; **next single Gitea run pending**. **P05-OIDC-02 single-run evidence:** Gitea Run #91 tested `4831165`: private Traefik:80/Host HTTP 200 and versioned socat/digest verification PASS, then run-owned forwarder process `exited` with code 1. `provision.py` and `browser.cjs` **not run**. Cleanup PASS; no owned containers/network/credentials left. The status-only readiness change exists in source but is not CI-proven because the forwarder failed first. Startup errno/error class requires a new approved CI-only P05-OIDC-03 scope. No reruns under P05-OIDC-02. ## P05-OIDC-03: forwarder diagnosis and same-run Python fallback The official four-service P02 backend, original browser/auth and Gitea workflow remain read-only. Run #91 proved private Traefik/Host route PASS but socat process exited 1. Now a single run-owned socat start checks status/HTTP and classifies only safe startup error classes from **pre-credential** logs. When unhealthy, only the owned diagnostic sidecar is removed; its container name/owner label and private proxy net namespace are reused by official `python:3.12-alpine` pinned to its pulled sha256 registry digest. Only the tracked `forwarder.py` is copied; it transparently relays 127.0.0.1:8080 → 127.0.0.1:80 with no HTTP parsing, storage, external port or token access. Both must satisfy original issuer/Host HTTP 200 before project/client/user creation. The existing `always()` cleanup is unchanged. Full browser login/session acceptance requires actual Gitea result; **source is not CI-verified yet**.