# tests/ci — Isolated Gitea verification tools This folder contains **CI-only** source/lockfile checks and OIDC discovery smoke support. Run these through the approved `.gitea/workflows/p05-ci.yml` on a disposable Linux runner. - `source_contract.py` checks the narrow P05 source/package constraints and paths. It is not a typecheck or application test. - `oidc_discovery.py` checks ZITADEL readiness, OIDC discovery, JWKS and fail-closed issuer/JWKS negative fixtures on the **disposable** Docker network. It does NOT log in a user or check an authenticated callback. - `account_negative.py` checks that an anonymous Account Portal call returns 401 and that a protected page redirects to `/signin`. It does NOT create a test user or prove real login. - `advisory_triage.py` summarizes available npm/pnpm registry advisory JSON with IDs, ranges and fixes, without changing dependency versions. - `compose.portless.override.yaml` is **CI-only**, adds `ports: !reset []` to clear P02's inherited Traefik host mapping. Run #83 failed because host 8080 was occupied; this post-run source correction is **not CI-verified**. Use both Compose files together and assert `proxy.ports` absent before startup. P02 dev Compose is unchanged. No real credentials or production domains are used. Never print bootstrap PATs, admin secrets, session cookies or `.env` contents. Cleanup of disposable volumes is mandatory; never apply `docker compose down -v` to a user's non-CI stack. - `backend_acceptance.sh` (P05-CI-03) is the manual backend-only Gitea runner preflight, portless Compose gate, four-service readiness, disposable database restart persistence and OIDC/JWKS smoke. Refuses pre-existing fixed network/project/volumes. - `backend_cleanup.sh` (P05-CI-03) is the workflow's `always()` cleanup script. It tears down only a marked run-owned Compose project and verifies that no project containers, volumes or fixed network remain. Unverified cleanup is an explicit failure. - Run from `.gitea/workflows/p05-backend-acceptance.yml` **only in isolated Gitea CI**, not on a production Docker host or local developer PC. **Run #86 PASS** on `03fb589`, including persistence and owned cleanup. No real user login/MFA E2E was run. - `security_advisory_gate.py` (P05-SEC-01) takes npm or pnpm registry audit JSON, rejects missing/errored/inconsistent metadata and requires **zero Moderate/High/Critical findings**. It is independent of the existing HIGH+ audit command and `advisory_triage.py` detailed advisory ID report. **Gitea Run #87** proved Account audit 0 and Login audit **2 Moderate** (`glob`, `minimatch`); strict Login gate correctly FAILED. Dedicated `.gitea/workflows/p05-security-acceptance.yml` is manual only; frozen installs/builds are CI-only and passed 1219/1219 Login unit regressions. - `transitive_override_contract.py` (P05-SEC-02) validates seven exact parent-scoped PNPM overrides, lock/importer consistency and absence of affected glob/minimatch versions. **Run #88 failed in this helper before pnpm frozen install** because its first regex also matched existing `>=` version-range override keys. Post-run regex restricted to `>glob`/`>minimatch` parent selectors, **not CI-tested**; next separately approved focused run required. The independent Run #88 live production advisory audit found 0 Moderate/High/Critical. Account jobs skipped as expected with `login_only=true`. Add new CI checks and update `MINIFEST.md`, `project/`, `docs/`, and `notes/` in the same approved phase. **P05-SEC-02-A01 final acceptance:** Existing corrected `transitive_override_contract.py` successfully executed in **Gitea Run #89** (exact seven parent selector and patched lock markers). Frozen PNPM install, Next Login standalone build, and Vitest 84/84 files/1219/1219 cases PASS. Separate production `security_advisory_gate.py` reports **0 Moderate/High/Critical**, no suppressed findings. Two Account jobs intentionally skipped using `login_only=true`. No local test run; no real authenticated OIDC session/production deployment. **P05-OIDC-01** is the new CI-only directory `tests/ci/oidc_e2e/`: exact files and first-party instructions in `README.md` and `MINIFEST.md` inside that folder. It is triggered **only** via new manual `.gitea/workflows/p05-oidc-acceptance.yml`. `run.sh` protects numeric run ownership, starts no-host-port official ZITADEL Compose, provisions a real disposable client/human via official IAM_OWNER PAT and runs pinned Chromium with the original Login V2 and unmodified Account Portal. It expects real PKCE/state/nonce/callback/session positive and negative results. `cleanup.sh` runs even on failure and must prove removal of **only** owned test containers, volumes, database/bootstrap credentials. **CI execution pending, not local tests or production proof.** **P05-OIDC-01 Run #90 terminal:** new `oidc_e2e/` harness started the original ZITADEL/PG/Login/Traefik services healthy with no host-published port. The private namespace loopback sidecar was **not ready**, so the provisioner timed out before creating a disposable project, OIDC client/user or running any browser checks. **No real OIDC accepted**. Gitea `always()` cleanup fully removed all run-owned volumes/containers/credentials and passed. No second run. P05-OIDC-02 should add safe CI-only startup/health diagnostics and pin the forwarder image before another single acceptance run. **P05-OIDC-02 Run #91:** Existing manual real-browser workflow with new CI-only forwarder source proved four healthy services, no host-published ports, private Traefik:80 `Host: localhost:8080` HTTP 200 and prebuilt socat version/digest check PASS. But the private forwarding process exited immediately with code **1**; actual client/user setup and browser/callback/session tests **NOT RUN**. `always()` cleanup verified absence of all run-owned state, PASS. No repeated run, no Auth.js or app edits. Preserve this exact evidence for a narrow P05-OIDC-03 startup diagnostic. **P05-OIDC-03:** `tests/ci/oidc_e2e/forwarder.py` is an stdlib-only private 127.0.0.1 TCP relay. `run.sh` classifies pre-credential socat startup failures and, if needed, switches to the official Python image pinned by sha256 within a single isolated CI cycle; existing exact-owner cleanup and original OAuth/Browser tests unchanged. Do not treat forwarder readiness alone as real OIDC authentication acceptance.