- Account Portal's Auth.js `session` callback now narrows the JWT's optional identity subject to a real `string` before computing the valid session identity. The previous code's non-null assertion could infer `{}` and failed TypeScript `TS2345` in Run #81. No login provider flow, PKCE/state/nonce, expiry rule, API guard, password or UI changes.
- Source-only/negative contract tests verify untrusted issuer/JWKS rejection; a CI-only started Account Portal checks unauthenticated `/api/account/me` returns 401/no-store and protected `/account` redirects to `/signin`. **No real authenticated user test**.
- Security gate still fails for HIGH/CRITICAL advisories. Separate JSON inventory records Moderate IDs, affected package/range and available patches; **no dependency changes**.
## How to run
Gitea > `vibtools/ZitPlane` > Actions > `ZitPlane P05 CI Verification` > Run workflow on `main`. This runs only on a Docker-capable, isolated Gitea runner. It never deploys to Coolify or production identity domains.
## Status and scope of proof
A green source/typecheck job does not prove an authenticated OIDC callback or MFA. A green Docker job proves **disposable local** backend readiness/discovery and Postgres persistence only, not Admin Console human login. Full OIDC E2E remains a separate planned scope.
The workflow uses a fixed P02 dev network, so it refuses to start when that network already exists; it must never stop another owner's containers or volumes. Temporary CI credentials must not appear in logs or the repository. When runner/Compose startup is unavailable, mark **BLOCKED**, not PASS.
| Official Login V2 (#172) | **PASS** | Frozen pnpm install, proto/client/Login V2 standalone production build; Vitest **84/84 files and 1219/1219 tests PASS** |
| Security (#173) | **PASS at HIGH/CRITICAL threshold** | 0 HIGH/CRITICAL in production audits; **18 Moderate Login advisory records** and **1 Moderate Account `next` package** identified; not fixed |
| Disposable Docker (#174) | **FAIL** | Alpine Git/checkout, Docker daemon/preflight, P02 Python contracts, images pull, PostgreSQL health, ZITADEL API and Login V2 health PASS. Traefik proxy failed host bind `0.0.0.0:8080`**port already allocated**. Restart/persistence and OIDC discovery/JWKS **NOT EXECUTED**. Always cleanup removed job-owned containers, network and named volumes |
**Post-run source-only correction (not verified):** added `tests/ci/compose.portless.override.yaml` with official Compose `ports: !reset []`; all backend CI Compose commands now include it, and config verifies that Traefik has no inherited host publishing. The developer Compose remains untouched. Official reference: https://docs.docker.com/reference/compose-file/merge/#reset-value.
**Outstanding:** CI-only portless override needs one separately approved verification run; database restart persistence and real OIDC discovery remain unverified. Full interactive login, OIDC callback, MFA and Admin Console login require a separate disposable E2E integration plan. All Moderate advisories require a reviewed dependency-only remediation phase before production acceptance.
Detailed advisory IDs/ranges and disposition: `notes/P05-CI-02.md`. **No second CI run**, no local tests/builds/Docker, no production deployment.