docs: update AI Studio design token audits

Refresh design token inventory files to reflect the latest UI sizing and layout configurations from the sandbox prototype.
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Md Najmul committed 2026-10-23 11:43:49 -05:00
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# Security Engine Manifest
## Purpose
Enforces client rate-limiting, event idempotency verification, and payload size bounds.
## Key Logic
- **Idempotency**: Drops duplicate `clientId + eventId` within a 5-minute TTL window.
- **Rate Limit**: Sliding per-second window configurable per client or globally.
- **Payload Guard**: Rejects payloads exceeding 100KB per event with explicit codes.
## Dependencies
- Native Node.js `Buffer`, `Map`
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export interface ValidationResult {
allowed: boolean;
reason?: string;
code?: 'RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED' | 'PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE' | 'DUPLICATE_EVENT' | 'MALFORMED_PAYLOAD';
}
export class SecurityEngine {
// Idempotency cache: key -> timestamp (expires after TTL)
private static idempotencySet = new Map<string, number>();
private static readonly IDEMPOTENCY_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes
// Rate limiter: clientId -> { count, windowStart }
private static rateLimitMap = new Map<string, { count: number; windowStart: number }>();
// Default Max payload size (100KB)
public static maxPayloadSizeBytes = 100 * 1024;
/**
* Idempotency Check:
* ClientId + EventId must be unique.
* Duplicate events are dropped silently or tagged.
*/
public static checkIdempotency(clientId: string, eventId: string): boolean {
if (!eventId) return true; // If no eventId generated, pass through
const key = `${clientId}:${eventId}`;
const now = Date.now();
// Periodic cleanup of stale idempotency keys
if (this.idempotencySet.size > 20000) {
for (const [k, timestamp] of this.idempotencySet.entries()) {
if (now - timestamp > this.IDEMPOTENCY_TTL_MS) {
this.idempotencySet.delete(k);
}
}
}
if (this.idempotencySet.has(key)) {
const storedTime = this.idempotencySet.get(key) || 0;
if (now - storedTime < this.IDEMPOTENCY_TTL_MS) {
return false; // Duplicate detected
}
}
this.idempotencySet.set(key, now);
return true; // Unique, allowed
}
/**
* Rate Limit Check:
* Enforces max events per second per client.
*/
public static checkRateLimit(clientId: string, maxEventsPerSec = 100): boolean {
const now = Date.now();
const current = this.rateLimitMap.get(clientId);
if (!current || now - current.windowStart >= 1000) {
this.rateLimitMap.set(clientId, { count: 1, windowStart: now });
return true;
}
if (current.count >= maxEventsPerSec) {
return false; // Rate limit exceeded
}
current.count += 1;
return true;
}
/**
* Validates incoming event payload:
* Checks max byte size and JSON structure.
*/
public static validateEvent(
clientId: string,
eventId: string,
payload: unknown,
clientMaxRate = 100
): ValidationResult {
// 1. Check idempotency
const isUnique = this.checkIdempotency(clientId, eventId);
if (!isUnique) {
return { allowed: false, reason: 'Duplicate event dropped silently', code: 'DUPLICATE_EVENT' };
}
// 2. Check rate limit
const withinLimit = this.checkRateLimit(clientId, clientMaxRate);
if (!withinLimit) {
return {
allowed: false,
reason: `Rate limit of ${clientMaxRate} events/sec exceeded for client ${clientId}`,
code: 'RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED',
};
}
// 3. Check payload size
const payloadStr = typeof payload === 'string' ? payload : JSON.stringify(payload);
const byteLength = Buffer.byteLength(payloadStr, 'utf8');
if (byteLength > this.maxPayloadSizeBytes) {
return {
allowed: false,
reason: `Payload size (${(byteLength / 1024).toFixed(1)} KB) exceeds limit of ${this.maxPayloadSizeBytes / 1024} KB`,
code: 'PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE',
};
}
return { allowed: true };
}
public static getStats() {
return {
activeIdempotencyKeys: this.idempotencySet.size,
rateLimitedClientsCount: this.rateLimitMap.size,
maxPayloadSizeBytes: this.maxPayloadSizeBytes,
};
}
}
export default SecurityEngine;