Source verification: exact GitHub/GitLab/Gitea remote `main` and local HEAD matched this SHA. Local working tree clean; local `origin` configured to `MdNurnobi-Dev/DataStack.git`, and its *local tracking ref* was stale (`725d3c5`), so `ahead 5` alone was NOT evidence GitHub `JILLU-Games` was behind. GitHub `JILLU-Games` read-only branch HEAD verified at `d725841ebc828d58cbe90f517da9e600f23c4630`. No force push, ref rewrite or upstream reset authorized.
## A. Proof excerpts (verbatim short source fragments, exact baseline files/lines)
### CI-02 — stale lockfile contract (P01)
`tests/phase07-deployment.test.ts:648-650`:
```ts
test("FINAL-DEPLOY-FIX-01: Single npm lockfile, Dockerfile .runtime-logs ownership parity, 8-table prisma sync, and cold-boot MCP bridge hydration",async()=>{
assert.equal(existsSync(resolve(process.cwd(),"bun.lock")),false,"Stale bun.lock must stay removed");
```
`git ls-files bun.lock` listed the file on baseline. **Patch reference**: check if any build consumer references it; if none, remove exactly `bun.lock` while preserving `package-lock.json`. Re-run this specific test.
Also **replace the other 3 obsolete implementation-detail regexes** with behavioral assertions against exported helper and page filtering/count data; do not just drop coverage. Exact final diff is generated only during approved P01.
### CI-03 — test-process hang anchor (P01)
`core/data/buffer.ts:347-352,379-391`:
```ts
state.flushTimer=setInterval(()=>{
voidthis.flush().catch(()=>undefined);
},state.batchFlushIntervalMs);
```
Run #45 suite exit codes 124: `r3-phase04-ui-metrics-rbac`, `r4-phase03-sdk-deploy-auth`, `r5-phase01-mcp-foundation-logs`, `r5-phase03-mcp-ui`. Timer is a **suspect**, not a proven sole root cause. **Patch reference:** instrument open handles and add narrow teardown in four named tests; `core/data/buffer.ts` is **read-only** unless new approval.
tests/phase01-auth.test.ts(88,17): error TS2540: Cannot assign to 'NODE_ENV' because it is a read-only property.
tests/r5-phase02-mcp-server.test.ts(510,8): error TS18046: 'deniedClientCreate.content' is of type 'unknown'.
tests/v2-phase01-storage-quotas.test.ts(762,64): error TS2554: Expected 0 arguments, but got 1.
```
**Patch reference:** exact 9 test files / line map in `001`. Use correct typings/type guards and current API signatures, not TS ignore or global tsconfig exclusion.
### CI-01 — Windows clean-install lockfile mismatch (P01)
Run #42 job 63:
```text
npm error Missing: @img/sharp-win32-x64@0.35.5 from lock file
npm error Missing: @unrs/resolver-binding-win32-x64-msvc@1.13.0 from lock file
```
Run #45 job 71 showed success **only after temporary runner**`npm install --package-lock-only`, followed by `npm ci` and Node SDK build. **Patch reference:**`package-lock.json` optional/native dependencies, retain pinned package graph; verify unchanged tracked lock under CI on Linux/Windows.
### CI-06 — Python runner packages (P03)
Run #45 job 67:
```text
E: Failed to fetch ... python3.9-venv_3.9.2-1+deb11u7_amd64.deb 404 Not Found
failed to create diff tar stream: lstat .../app/node_modules/@uiw: no such file or directory
```
`docker/Dockerfile.server` produced tagged ingestion image; Docker Compose `config --no-interpolate --quiet` PASS. **Patch reference:**`.gitea/workflows/datastack-docker-ci.yml` runner/cache/BuildKit; Dockerfile modification conditional on independent reproduction and new approval.
### CI-08 — npm advisory summary (P03)
Run #50 job 76:
```text
24 vulnerabilities (23 moderate, 1 high)
26 vulnerabilities (25 moderate, 1 high)
```
**No evidence of specific advisory IDs yet.** Patch reference `package.json`/`package-lock.json` only after isolated `npm audit --json` with package/CVE/runtime attribution. Never add counts or claim 50 unique advisories.
**Potential issue**: crash after partial write or before list trim may replay buffered rows. Test with injected partial failures and compare event IDs before prescribing exactly-once guarantee.
### R-03 — Health shows service liveness (P02, conditional)
- P02 conditional: `server/index.js:165-193,943-994,1939-1956`, `server/socket/handlers.js:583-602`, `server/workers/csvWriter.js:265-323`, `app/api/health/route.ts:95-111`; associated test files. Read-only until fault reproduction.
- P03: `.gitea/workflows/datastack-ci.yml`, `datastack-python-ci.yml`, `datastack-docker-ci.yml`, `datastack-eslint-ci.yml`; `package.json` / `package-lock.json` only justified dependency changes. Source Dockerfile edits separately approved only if needed.
## C. Documentation baseline update record
This file **freezes the source baseline**, not the future documentation-commit SHA. After adding `notes/**`, record commit SHA and three remote SHAs in `notes/003` and the user-facing result. Subsequent P01 implementation should inspect `git diff d725841ebc828d58cbe90f517da9e600f23c4630..HEAD` and permit only these notes as intervening changes; any unexpected source edits require a new review.
The root `@tybys/wasm-util@0.9.0` remains unchanged; 68 optional entries added, 1293 old entries unchanged, none removed/repinned, all added entries with registry tarball and integrity, `package.json` unchanged. `bun.lock` removed after checking no active consumers. Windows and Linux `npm ci --no-audit --no-fund` PASS using committed lock without temporary regeneration.
### Test-only teardown correction (CI-03 / CI-05)
`tests/r5-phase01-mcp-foundation-logs.test.ts` local CommonJS require declaration now explicitly includes `stopTimers`, matching the existing runtime export; `test.after` releases ingestion timers and `DataBufferEngine.shutdown()` without any changes to runtime source:
Remaining CI-05 corrections were confined to 9 test file type contracts; CI-04 replaced old `isClientExpired` page regex expectations with `classifyUiClientStatus` + `summarizeUiClientCounts` behavioral assertions. No TS strictness flags disabled, no global `any` blanket suppression, no SDK/API runtime signature changed.
### Exact gate results
- [Run #58](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/58): failed at lockfile nested dependency before tests; historical and superseded.
- [Run #59](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/59): overall failed because exactly one test mock TypeScript declaration lacked `stopTimers`, but separate job results independently verified **24/24 TypeScript suites exit0**, no timeouts, Linux/Windows committed-lock clean npm installs, Node SDK compilation and Next.js standalone build + 22/22 pages all PASS.
- [Run #60](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/60): focused quality-only retry after exact test-type correction, **strict `npx tsc --noEmit` PASS 0 errors** and **`npm run lint` PASS**.
- [Run #48](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/48): previous Python SDK 14/14 PASS, no Python source edits or P01 rerun.
Targeted path/diff audit from prior documentation HEAD: 16 scoped code/test/CI paths plus notes `001–006`; `git diff --check` PASS. P02 remaining R-01…R-03 are conditional reliability risks, not confirmed application bugs. P03 Docker/Python-runner/advisory issues still open. No live app, deployment, database, security defaults or user features changed.
`server/socket/handlers.js:583-602` invokes `await onBufferPush()` and then calls `callback({success:true,eventId})` unless an exception escapes. Test: `tests/phase02-sync.test.ts`, `P02 R-01 diagnostic`, overriding fake Redis `rpush` to reject; check ACK, absent Redis persistence, volatile RAM, and simulated reset. No real process exit.
### R-02 replay after append-before-trim
`core/data/buffer.ts:795-809` and Port-4000 `server/index.js:981-993` order `appendBatch()/writeBatch()` before `redis.ltrim()`. Test: `tests/phase03-storage-buffer.test.ts`, `P02 R-02 diagnostic`; inject the *first* LTRIM failure only after successful append, verify still queued, retry flush and count duplicate `eventId` in appended rows. Web-side representative fault-injection; not a complete ingestion-crash certificate.
### R-03 public status versus dependency readiness
`server/index.js:1926-1957` catches Redis LLEN error, sets `redisConnected=false`, and returns HTTP 200 `status:online`. Test `P02 R-03 diagnostic` mocks LLEN failure and recovery. This preserves existing public shape rather than implementing a readiness endpoint. PG startup fail-closed coverage remains source-only/NOT VERIFIED.
**Patch scope:** modified only `tests/phase02-sync.test.ts` and `tests/phase03-storage-buffer.test.ts` (plus notes/001–006). Original local user-staged P01 work preserved. Runtime files examined read-only. No production host, Redis, DB, CSV, API, service, CI workflow, release, or security setting changed.
### CI #63 observed P02 results
-`P02 R-01 diagnostic: Redis RPUSH failure yields positive WS ACK for volatile RAM-only event` — **ok 15**, test suite `phase02-sync` exit 0. Diagnostic indicates acknowledged event loss on simulated RAM reset when Redis has no record.
-`P02 R-03 diagnostic: Redis query failure leaves public ingestion health 200/online` — **ok 16**, same suite exit 0, Redis flag false while liveness stays online.
-`P02 R-02 diagnostic: post-CSV Redis trim failure replays identical event on retry` — **ok 18**, `phase03-storage-buffer` suite exit 0; duplicate append after retry reproduced on representative web buffer path. **Direct ingestion Port 4000 CSV worker crash coverage remains outstanding** and should be requested in remediation approval before guarantee changes.
- These three diagnostic tests **prove findings, do not close production-readiness**. See Gitea https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/63; never call run successful until terminal conclusion is confirmed. No server-side source fix applied.
## F. P02 Remediation Candidate Patch Proof — 2026-11-22
Base: Gitea/GitHub published P02 diagnostic tree `fd57a3518d14bcb8367ce9ab9c3ec306bcfc9898`; GitLab distinct commit, same previous tree. Local candidate commit `44eee8877e40d1683f44502c2a0ba3d437a03b88` on isolated worktree. Initial exact delta: 5 approved source/test paths, 310 insertions and 22 deletions, no application UI, Python SDK, auth, public health route, CI or deployment edit. `git diff --check` and `node --check` on JS files PASS.
-`server/index.js:pushEventsToRedisOrFallback`: catch RPUSH failure, keep previous RAM buffering, throw sanitized `BUFFER_PERSIST_FAILED`; no positive ACK for that branch.
-`server/socket/handlers.js:sync_data/batch_sync`: negative ACK and best-effort claimed idempotency-key rollback with negative retry guard, no change to legitimate duplicate success path or existing auth/limits/error codes.
-`server/index.js:flushBuffer` and `core/data/buffer.ts:flush`: scoped streaming CSV/CSV.gz read-before-reappend (parsing quoted/multiline rows), exact client/date/event ID match; failures abort before Redis LTRIM. No changes to `server/workers/csvWriter.js`.
-`tests/phase02-sync.test.ts`: R-01 single/batch outage and duplicate claim ACK negative, successful recovery ACK, and unchanged R-03 liveness.
-`tests/phase03-storage-buffer.test.ts`: web-side replay verifies exactly one physically stored row; new direct Port 4000 writer Redis-trim failure/recovery proof. All tests on fake Redis and disposable temp CSV paths.
**Unverified:** Gitea P02 implementation acceptance was unavailable due inaccessible host/connector. Local `npm ci` not confirmed successful. Do not invent a CI run ID or claim full PASS. Full cross-process transactional exactly-once and all Redis claim crash windows are out of proof scope and may require exact additional approval. The streaming dedupe scan changes I/O cost per flush; performance validation before production is required.
### Blocked acceptance evidence — actual tool outcomes
- JS syntax: local `node --check server/index.js` and `node --check server/socket/handlers.js` PASS.
- Source scope: local `git diff --check` PASS; only the five allowed P02 runtime/test paths changed before notes updates.
- Gitea: connection returned `UNAVAILABLE: McpServerError: Connection failed`; Git remote `dev.ivib.cc` unresponsive. No Gitea CI run ID exists for candidate `44eee8877e40d1683f44502c2a0ba3d437a03b88`.
- Local Windows npm: `npm ci` failed `ETARGET yaml@2.9.1` and cleanup `EPERM` in the isolated worktree, **not** a TypeScript/test result. Dependency changes are out of P02 scope.
- Therefore neither TS typecheck nor regression-suite remediation acceptance is established; keep P02 BLOCKED and do not advance P03 or alter any protected runtime/source beyond this approval.
## F. P02-RUNTIME-REMEDIATION-02 — Exact edge-case proof and scope audit (2026-11-22)
**Baseline**`fd57a3518d14bcb8367ce9ab9c3ec306bcfc9898`; isolated branch `p02-runtime-remediation-20261122`; patch revision `5c880885378ae0f4fa8dd3a145f9c7055dada635`. Scope: `server/index.js` (RPUSH fallback/onBufferPush/flush), `server/socket/handlers.js` (single/batch ACK + durability verification helper), `core/data/buffer.ts` (flush), `tests/{phase02-sync,phase03-storage-buffer,r4-phase02-ingestion-audit-streaming}.test.ts` and `notes/001–006` only. No other source file/CI workflow/dependency/SDK/UI change.
**Runtime contract and tests:** configured Redis RPUSH rejection -> negative `BUFFER_PERSIST_FAILED`; Redis-free Socket.IO ACK -> synchronous local CSV flush, with negative ACK on disk error; fail closed on previous Redis idempotency claim unless persisted to Redis buffer or matching physical CSV; recover same eventId after Redis reconnection; mixed batch uncertain duplicate remains negative until persistence proven. R-02 test injects failure after Port 4000 CSV append and before Redis trim, verifies subsequent retry does not add another row, including moved/rotated `.csv.gz`. R-03 `/health` remains unchanged.
**Test-only HTTP residual diagnostic:**`tests/phase02-sync.test.ts` adds Redis RPUSH failure against `POST /api/events` on a fake Redis. Expected prior behavior: HTTP 200 `success:true` while `DataBufferEngine.getLocalBufferSnapshot()` has the event and Redis buffered list is empty, then simulated RAM loss. This *diagnostic PASS* would confirm a remaining risk, not a completed fix. Source: `app/api/events/route.ts:744-754`, `core/data/buffer.ts:412-442,481-491`, `core/Security/security.ts:230-375`, Node SDK `sdk/node/datastack/index.ts:643-666,916-942`. Those runtime methods are **READ ONLY under current approval**.
**CI ledger:** [#66](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/66) initial in-scope implementation overall SUCCESS; [#68](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/68) discovered same-ID retry local claim leak, corrected in subsequent branch commit; [#70](https://dev.ivib.cc/vibtools/DataStack/actions/runs/70) revised source/test acceptance queued/running as of this addendum. Do not assert it PASS without terminal proof.
**Security/limitations:** never expose Redis backend errors or credentials in ACKs; preserve auth, quotas, rate limits and SDK response fields. Duplicate proof reads no more than 512 recent Redis buffered records and scans up to 256 MiB of CSV partition data with an abort deadline of 1800 ms, refusing uncertain duplicate-success. R-02 streaming CSV scan per flush has unmeasured throughput cost; no globally atomic multi-process exactly-once claim. Unmodified production data, no migrations, no live events, no releases/deploys; original local root staged changes untouched. P02 remains BLOCKED until a separate narrow HTTP durability approval or an equivalent tested safe contract.